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3École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010SUMMARYGenotype imputation is a fundamental step in genomic data analysis, where missing variant genotypes are
predicted using the existing genotypes of nearby ‘‘tag’’ variants. Although researchers can outsource geno-
type imputation, privacy concerns may prohibit genetic data sharing with an untrusted imputation service.
Here, we developed secure genotype imputation using efficient homomorphic encryption (HE) techniques.
In HE-based methods, the genotype data are secure while it is in transit, at rest, and in analysis. It can
only be decrypted by the owner. We compared secure imputation with three state-of-the-art non-secure
methods and found that HE-based methods provide genetic data security with comparable accuracy for
common variants. HE-based methods have time and memory requirements that are comparable or lower
than those for the non-secure methods. Our results provide evidence that HE-basedmethods can practically
perform resource-intensive computations for high-throughput genetic data analysis. The source code is
freely available for download at https://github.com/K-miran/secure-imputation.INTRODUCTION
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) (Ng and Kirkness, 2010;
Shendure et al., 2017) has become the standard technique in
clinical settings for tailoring personalized treatments (Rehm,
2017) and in research settings for building reference genetic da-
tabases (Schwarze et al., 2018; 1000 Genomes Project Con-
sortium, 2015; Chisholm et al., 2013). Technological advances
in the last decade enabled a massive increase in the throughput
of WGS methods (Heather and Chain, 2016), which provided the
opportunity for population-scale sequencing (Goldfeder et al.,Cell Systems 12, 1–13, No
This is an open access article under the CC BY-N2017), where a large sample from a population is sequenced
for studying ancestry and complex phenotypes (Lango Allen
et al., 2010 throughout the article Locke et al., 2015), as well as
rare (Agarwala et al., 2013; Gibson, 2012; Chen et al., 2019)
and chronic diseases (Cooper et al., 2008). Although the price
of sequencing has been decreasing, the sample sizes are
increasing to accommodate the power necessary for new
studies. It is anticipated that tens of millions of individuals will
have access to their personal genomes in the next few years.
The increasing size of sequencing data creates new chal-
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much attention in recent years. Most notably, the increasing
prevalence of genomic data, e.g., direct-to-consumer testing
and recreational genealogy, makes it harder to share genomic
data due to privacy concerns. Genotype data are very accurate
in identifying the owner because of their high dimensionality, and
leakage can cause concerns about discrimination and stigmati-
zation (Nissenbaum, 2009). Also, the recent cases of forensic us-
age of genotype data are making it very complicated to share
data for research purposes. The identification risks extend to
family members of the owner, since a large portion of the genetic
data are shared with relatives. Many attacks have been pro-
posed on genomic data sharing models, where the correlative
structure of the variant genotypes provides enough power to ad-
versaries to make phenotype inference and individual re-identifi-
cation possible (Nyholt et al., 2009). Therefore, it is of the utmost
importance to ensure that genotype data are shared securely.
There is a strong need for new methods and frameworks that
will enable decreasing the cost and facilitate the analysis and
management of genome sequencing.
One of the main techniques used for decreasing the cost of
large-scale genotyping is in silico genotype imputation; i.e.,
measuring genotypes at a subsample of variants, e.g., using a
genotyping array, and then utilizing the correlations among the
genotypes of nearby variants (the variants that are close to
each other in genomic coordinates) and imputing themissing ge-
notypes using the sparsely genotyped variants (Howie et al.,
2011; Das et al., 2018; Marchini and Howie, 2010). Imputation
methods aim at capturing the linkage disequilibrium patterns
on the genome. These patterns emerge because genomic
recombination occurs at hotspots rather than at uniformly
random positions along the genome. The genotyping arrays
are designed around the idea of selecting a small set of ‘‘tag’’
variants, as small as 1% of all variants, that optimize the trade-
off between cost and imputation accuracy (Hoffmann et al.,
2011; Stram, 2004). Imputation methods learn the correlations
among variant genotypes by using population-scale sequencing
projects (Loh et al., 2016). In addition to filling in missing geno-
types, the imputation process has many other advantages.
Combining low-cost array platforms with computational geno-
type imputation methods decreases genotyping costs and in-
creases the power of genome-wide association studies
(GWASs) by increasing sample sizes (Tam et al., 2019). Accurate
imputation can also greatly help with the fine-mapping of causal
variants (Schaid et al., 2018) and is vital for meta-analysis of the
GWAS (Evangelou and Ioannidis, 2013). Genotype imputation is
now a standard and integral step in performing GWAS. Although
imputation methods can predict only the variant genotypes that
exist in the panels, the panels’ sample sizes are increasing
rapidly; e.g., in projects such as TOPMed (Taliun et al., 2019;
TOPMed, 2016) will provide training data for imputation methods
to predict rarer variant genotypes, and this can increase the
sensitivity of GWAS.
Although imputation and sparse genotypingmethods enable a
vast decrease in genotyping costs, they are computationally very
intensive and require management of large genotype panels and
interpretation of the results (Howie et al., 2012). The imputation
tasks can be outsourced to third parties, such as the Michigan
Imputation Server, where users upload the genotypes (as a2 Cell Systems 12, 1–13, November 17, 2021Variant Call Format, VCF, file) to a server that performs imputa-
tion internally using a large computing system. The imputed ge-
notypes are then sent back to the user. However, there are major
privacy (Naveed et al., 2015) and data security (Berger and Cho,
2019) concerns over using these services, since the genotype
data are analyzed in plaintext format where any adversary who
has access to the third party’s computer can view, copy, or
even modify the genotype data. As genotype imputation is one
of the central initial steps in many genomic analysis pipelines,
it is essential that the imputation be performed securely to
ensure that these pipelines can be computed securely as a
whole. For instance, although several secure methods for
GWAS have been developed (Cho et al., 2018), if genotype impu-
tation (a vital step in GWAS analyses) is not performed securely,
it is not possible to make sure GWAS analysis can be performed
securely.
In order to test the current state-of-the-art methodologies for
benchmarking the feasibility of the cryptographic methods for
genotype imputation, we organized the genotype imputation
track in iDASH2019 Genomic Privacy Challenges. This track
benchmarkedmore than a dozenmethods on a small scale (sup-
plemental information; Table S1) to rank the most promising
approaches for secure genotype imputation. The methods
developed by the top winning teams led us (organizers and con-
testants) to perform this study to report a more comprehensive
analysis of the secure genotype imputation framework, including
benchmarks with state-of-the-art methods. We developed and
implemented several approaches for secure genotype imputa-
tion. Our methods make use of the homomorphic encryption
(HE) formalism (Gentry, 2009) that provides mathematically
provable, and potentially one of the strongest security guaran-
tees for protecting genotype data while imputation is performed
in an untrusted semi-honest environment. To include a compre-
hensive set of approaches, we focus on three state-of-the-art HE
cryptosystems, namely, Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV)
(Brakerski, 2012; Fan and Vercauteren, 2012), Cheon-Kim-
Kim-Song (CKKS) (Cheon et al., 2017), and the fully homomor-
phic encryption over the torus (TFHE) (Chillotti et al., 2020; Boura
et al., 2018). In our HE-based framework, genotype data are en-
crypted by the data owner before outsourcing the data. After this
point, the data always remain encrypted, i.e., encrypted in
transit, in use, and at rest; it is never decrypted until the results
are sent to the data owner. The strength of our HE-based frame-
work stems from the fact that the genotype data remain encryp-
ted even while the imputation is being performed. Hence, even if
the imputation is outsourced to an untrusted third party, any
semi-honest adversaries learn nothing from the encrypted
data. This property makes the HE-based framework very power-
ful. For an untrusted third party who does not have access to the
private key, the genotype data are indistinguishable from
random noise (i.e., practically of no use) at any stage of the impu-
tation process. Our HE framework provides the strongest form of
security for outsourcing genotype imputation comparedwith any
other approach under the same adversarial model.
HE-based frameworks have been deemed impractical since
their inception. Therefore, in comparisonwith other cryptograph-
ically secure methods, such as multiparty computation (Cho
et al., 2018) and trusted execution environments (Kockan et al.,
2020), HE-based frameworks have received little attention.
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010Recent theoretical breakthroughs in the HE literature and a
strong community effort (HES, n.d. 2020) have since rendered
HE-based systems practical. However, many of these improve-
ments are only beginning to be reflected in practical implemen-
tations and applications of HE algorithms. In this study, we
provide evidence for the practicality of the HE formalism by
building secure and ready-to-deploy methods for genotype
imputation. We perform detailed benchmarking of the time and
memory requirements of HE-based imputation methods and
demonstrate the feasibility of large-scale secure imputation. In
addition, we compared HE-based imputation methods with the
state-of-the-art plaintext, i.e., non-secure, imputation methods,
and we found comparable performance (with a slight decrease)
in imputation accuracy with the benefit of total genomic data
security.
WepresentHE-based imputationmethods in the context of two
main steps, as this enables a general modular approach. The first
step is imputation model building, where imputation models are
trained using the reference genotype panel with a set of tag vari-
ants (variant genotypes on an Illumina array platform) to impute
the genotypes for a set of target variants, e.g., common variants
in the 1,000 Genomes Project (1000 Genomes Project Con-
sortium, 2015) samples. The second step is the secure imputation
step, where the encrypted tag variant genotypes are used to pre-
dict the target genotypes (which are encrypted) by using the impu-
tation models trained in the first step. This step, i.e., imputation
model evaluation using the encrypted tag variant genotypes, is
where the HE-based methods are deployed. In principle, the
model training step needs to be performed only once when the
tag variants do not change, i.e., the same array platform is used
for multiple studies. Although these steps seem independent,
model evaluation is heavily dependent on the representation and
encoding of the genotype data, and the model complexity affects
the timing and memory requirements of the secure outsourced
imputation methods. However, our results suggest that linear
models (or any other model that can be approximated by linear
models) canbealmost seamlessly trainedandevaluatedsecurely,
where the model builders (1st step) and model evaluators (2nd
step) can work independently. However, our results also show
that there is an accompanying performance penalty, especially
for the rare variants, in using these models, and we believe that
new and accurate methods are needed to provide both privacy
and imputation accuracy. It should be noted that the performance
penalty stems not from HE-model evaluation but from the lower
performanceofplaintextmodels.Weprovideapipeline that imple-
ments both model training and evaluation steps so that it can be
run onany selectionof tag variants.Wemake the implementations
publicly available, so that they can be used as a reference by the
computational genomics community.
RESULTS
Wepresent the scenario and the setting for secure imputation and
describe the secure imputation approaches we developed. Next,
we present accuracy comparisons with the current state-of-the-
art non-secure imputation methods and the time and memory re-
quirements of the secure imputationmethods. Finally, we present
the comparison of the time and memory requirements of our
secure imputation pipeline with the non-secure methods.Genotype imputation scenario
Figure 1A illustrates the secure imputation scenario. A researcher
genotypes a cohort of individuals by using genotyping arrays or
other targeted methods, such as whole-exome sequencing, and
calls the variants using a variant caller such as the Genome Anal-
ysis Toolkit, GATK (Depristo et al., 2011). After genotyping, the ge-
notypes are stored in plaintext, i.e., unencrypted and not secure
for outsourcing. Each variant genotype is represented by one of
the three values f0;1; 2g, where 0 indicates a homozygous refer-
ence genotype, 1 indicates a heterozygous genotype, and 2 indi-
cates a homozygous alternate genotype. To secure the genotype
data, the researcher generates two keys: a public key for encrypt-
ing the genotype data and a private key for decrypting the
imputed data. The public key is used to encrypt the genotype
data into ciphertext, i.e., random-looking data that contain the ge-
notype data in a secure form. It is mathematically provable (i.e.,
equivalent to the hardness of solving the ring learning with errors,
or RLWE, problem, Lyubashevsky et al., 2010) that the encrypted
genotypes cannot be decrypted into plaintext genotype data by a
third party without the private key, which is in the possession of
only the researcher. Even if an unauthorized third party copies
the encrypted data without authorization (e.g., hacking, stolen
hard drives), they cannot gain any information from the data as
they are essentially random noise without the private key. The se-
curity (and privacy) of the genotype data are therefore guaran-
teed, as long as the private key is not compromised. The security
guarantee of the imputationmethods is based on the fact that ge-
notype data are encrypted in transit, during analysis, and at rest.
The only plaintext data that are transmitted to the untrusted entity
are the locations of the variants, i.e., the chromosomes and
positions of the variants. Since the variant locations are
publicly known for genotyping arrays, they should not leak any
information. However, when the genotyping is performed by
sequencing-based methods, the variant positions may leak infor-
mation, as we discuss more in the next sections.
The encrypted genotypes are sent through a channel to the
imputation service. The channel does not have to be secure
against an eavesdropper because the genotype data are encryp-
ted by the researcher. However, secure channels should be
authenticated to prevent malicious man-in-the-middle attacks
(Gangan, 2015). The encrypted genotypes are received by the
imputation service, an honest-but-curious entity, i.e., they will
receive the data legitimately and extract all the private informa-
tion they can from the data. However, a privacy breach is impos-
sible as the data are always encrypted when they are in the
possession of the imputation service. Hence, the only reason-
able action for the secure imputation server is to perform the ge-
notype imputation and to return the data to the researcher. It is
possible that the imputation server acts maliciously and inten-
tionally returns bad-quality data to the researcher using badly
calibrated models. However, it is economically or academically
reasonable to assume that this is unlikely, since it would be
easy to detect this behavior on the researcher’s side and to
advertise the malicious or low quality of the service to other re-
searchers. Therefore, we assume that the secure server is
semi-honest, and it performs the imputation task as accurately
as possible. However, more complex malicious entities that
perform complex attacks (e.g., slight biases in the models) are
harder to detect. We treat these scenarios as out of scope ofCell Systems 12, 1–13, November 17, 2021 3
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Figure 1. Illustration of secure genotype imputation
(A) Illustration of the genotype imputation scenario. The incomplete genotypes aremeasured by genotyping arrays withmissing genotypes (represented by stars).
Encryption generates random-looking strings from the genotypes. At the server, encrypted genotypes are encoded, then they are used to compute the missing
variant genotype probabilities. The encrypted probabilities are sent to the researcher, who decrypts the probabilities and identifies the genotypes with the highest
probabilities (italic values).
(legend continued on next page)
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010our current study. Providing secure services against malicious
entities is a worthwhile direction to explore for future studies.
After the receipt of the encrypted genotypes by the server, the
first step is recoding of the encrypted data into a packed format
(Figure S1) that is optimized for the secure imputation process.
This step is performed to decrease time requirements and to
optimize the memory usage of the imputation process. The
data are coded to enable analysis of multiple genotypes in one
cycle of the imputation process (Dowlin et al., 2017). The next
step is the secure evaluation of the imputationmodels, which en-
tails securely computing the genotype probability for each
variant by using the encrypted genotypes. The variants received
from the researcher are treated as tag variants whose genotypes
are used as features in the imputation model to predict the
‘‘target’’ variants, i.e., the missing variants (Figure 1B). For
each target variant, the corresponding imputation model uses
the genotypes of the nearby tag variants to predict the target
variant genotype in terms of genotype probabilities. In other
words, we use a number of nearby tag variants to build an impu-
tation model for the respective target variant such that the tag
variants that are nearby (in genomic coordinates) are treated
as the features for assigning genotype scores for the target
variant. After the imputation is performed, the encrypted geno-
type probabilities are sent to the researcher. The researcher de-
crypts the genotype probabilities by using a private key. The final
genotypes can be assigned using the maximum probability ge-
notype estimate, i.e., by selecting the genotype with the highest
probability for each variant.
Genotype imputation models
We provide five approaches implemented by four different
teams. For simplicity of description, we refer to the teams as
Chimera, EPFL, SNU, and UTHealth-Microsoft Research
(UTMSR) (see STAR Methods). Among these, CKKS is used in
three different approaches (EPFL-CKKS, SNU-CKKS, and
UTMSR-CKKS), and BFV and TFHE are each utilized by separate
approaches (UTMSR-BFV and Chimera-TFHE, respectively).
The teams independently developed and trained the plaintext
imputation models using the reference genotype panel dataset.
For each target variant, the tag variants in the vicinity of the target
variant are used for imputing the target variant, i.e., the tag var-
iants in the vicinity are used as features in the imputation models.
The chimera team trained a logistic regression model and the
EPFL team trained a multinomial logistic regression model. (Fig-
ure S4; Tables S3, S4, and S7); the SNU team used a 1-hidden-
layer neural network (Figures 1C, S2, and S3; Table S5); and the
UTMSR team trained a linear regression model (Figures 1C
and S5).
Genotype representation
All methods treat the genotypes as continuous predictions,
except for the Chimera and SNU teams who utilized a one-hot
encoding of the genotypes (see STAR Methods), e.g., 0/
ð1;0;0Þ, 1/ð0; 1;0Þ, and 2/ð0;0; 1Þ.(B) Building of the plaintext model for genotype imputation. The server uses a pub
models are stored in the plaintext domain. The model in the current study is a line
within a k variant vicinity of the target variant.
(C) The plaintext models implemented under the secure frameworks.Tag variant (feature) selection
The selection of the tag variants is important as these represent
the features that are used for imputing each target variant. In
general, we found that the models that use 30–40 tag variants
provide optimal results (for the current array platform) in terms
of imputation accuracy (Tables S2, S5, S6, and S8). As previous
studies have shown, tag variant selection can provide an in-
crease in imputation accuracy (Yu and Schaid, 2007). Finally,
we observed a general trend of linear scaling with the number
of target variants (as shown in Figure S6 and other Tables S1–
S9). This provides evidence that there is minimal extra overhead
(in addition to the linear increasing sample size) for scaling to
genome-wide and population-wide computations.
Training and secure evaluation of models
We present the accuracy comparison results further on. We
include extended discussion of the specific ideas used for
training and for secure evaluation of the genotype imputation
models in supplemental information.
Accuracy comparisons with the non-secure methods
Wefirst analyzed the imputation accuracy of the securemethods
with their plaintext (non-secure) counterparts that are the most
popular state-of-the-art imputation methods. We compared
secure imputation methods with IMPUTE2 (Howie et al., 2009),
Minimac3 (Das et al., 2016) (and Minimac4, which is an efficient
re-implementation of Minimac3), and Beagle (Browning et al.,
2018) methods. These plaintext methods utilize Hidden Markov
models (HMMs) for genotype imputation (see STAR Methods).
The population panels and the pre-computed estimates of the
recombination frequencies are taken as input to the methods.
Each method is set to provide a measure of genotype probabil-
ities, in addition to the imputed genotype values.
To perform comparisons in a realistic setting, we used the var-
iants on the Illumina Duo 1M version 3 array platform (Johnson
et al., 2013). This is a popular array platform that covers more
than 1.1 million variants and is used by population-scale geno-
typing studies such as HAPMAP (Belmont et al., 2003). We ex-
tracted the genotypes of the variants that were probed by this
array platform and overlapped with the variants identified by
the 1,000 Genomes Project population panel of 2,504 individ-
uals. For simplicity of comparisons, we focused on chromosome
22. The variants that are probed by the array are treated as the
tag variants that are used to estimate the target variant geno-
types. The target variants are defined as variants on chromo-
some 22 whose allele frequency is greater than 5% as estimated
by the 1,000 Genomes Project (1000 Genomes Project Con-
sortium, 2015). We used the 16,184 tag variants and 80,882
common target variants. Then, we randomly divided the 2,504
individuals into a training genotype panel of 1,500 samples and
a testing panel of 1,004 samples. The training panel is used as
the input to the plaintext methods (i.e., IMPUTE2, Minimac3-4,
and Beagle) and also for building the plaintext imputationmodels
of the secure methods. Each method is then used to impute thelicly available panel to build genotype estimation models for each variant. The
ar model where each variant genotype is modeled using genotypes of variants










































Figure 2. Accuracy benchmark
(A–D) Accuracy for all genotypes (A) and the non-reference genotypes (B) are shown for each method (x axis). The average accuracy value is shown at the top of
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010target variants using the tag variants. Figure 2A shows the com-
parison of genotype prediction accuracy computed over all the
predictions made by the methods. The non-secure methods
show the highest accuracy among all the methods. The secure
methods exhibit very similar accuracy, whereas the closest
method follows with only a 2%–3%decrease in accuracy. To un-
derstand the differences between the methods, we also
computed the accuracy of the non-reference genotype predic-
tions (see STAR Methods; Figure 2B). The non-secure methods
show slightly higher accuracy compared with the secure
methods. These results indicate that the proposed secure6 Cell Systems 12, 1–13, November 17, 2021methods provide perfect data privacy at the cost of a slight
decrease in imputation accuracy.
Next, we assessed whether the genotype probabilities (or
scores) computed from the secure methods provide meaningful
measures for choosing reliably imputed genotypes. For this, we
calculated the sensitivity and the positive predictive value (PPV)
of the imputed genotypes whose scores exceed the cutoff (see
STAR Methods). To analyze how cutoff selections affect the ac-
curacy metrics, we shifted the cutoff (swept the cutoff over the
range of genotype scores) so that the accuracy is computed






































Figure 3. Genotype imputation accuracy benchmarking for stratified populations
(A–H) The population stratification of the accuracy is shown for EUR all genotypes (A) and non-ref genotypes (B), AMR all (C), and non-ref (D) genotypes, and AFR
all (E), and non-ref genotypes.
(legend continued on next page)
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010inclusive genotypes (low cutoff). We then plotted the sensitivity
versus the PPV (Figure 2C). Compared with the secure methods,
the non-secure methods generally show higher sensitivity at the
same PPV. However, secure methods can capture more than
80% of the known genotypes with 98% accuracy. The same re-
sults hold for the non-reference genotypes’ prediction accuracy
(Figure 2D). These results indicate that secure genotype predic-
tions can be filtered by setting cutoffs to improve accuracy.
We also evaluated the population-specific effects on imputa-
tion accuracy. For this, we divided the testing panel into three
populations—210 European (EUR), 135 American (AMR), and
272 African (AFR) samples—as provided by the 1,000 Genomes
Project. The training panel yielded 389 AFR, 212 AMR, and 293
EUR samples. Figures 3A and 3B show genotype and non-refer-
ence genotype accuracy for EUR, respectively. We observed
that the non-secure and secure methods are similar in terms of
accuracy. We observed that the secure CKKS (UTMSR-CKKS)
scheme with a linear prediction model outperformed Beagle in
the EUR population, with marginally higher accuracy. We
observed similar results for AMR populations where the non-
secure methods performed at the top and secure methods
showed very similar but slightly lower accuracy (Figures 3C
and 3D). For AFR populations, the non-reference genotype pre-
diction accuracy is lower for all the methods (Figures 3E and 3F).
This is mainly rooted in the fact that the African populations show
distinct properties that are not yet well characterized by the
1,000 Genomes Panels. We expect that the larger panels can
provide better imputation accuracy.
To further investigate the nature of the imputation errors, we
analyzed the characteristics of imputation errors of eachmethod
by computing the confusion matrices (Figure S7). We found that
themost frequent errors aremade when the real genotype is het-
erozygous, and the imputed genotype is a homozygous refer-
ence genotype. The pattern holds predominantly in secure and
non-secure methods, although the errors are slightly lower, as
expected, for the non-secure methods. Overall, these results
indicate that secure imputation models can provide genotype
imputations comparable with their non-secure counterparts.
To test the performance of the methods on rare variants, we
focused on the 117,904 variants whose minor allele frequency
(MAF) is between 0.5% and 5%. These variants represent harder
to impute variants since they are much less represented
comparedwith the common variants. The results show that the vi-
cinity-based approaches that our methods use show a clear
decrease in performance compared with the HMM-based ap-
proaches (Figure 3G). This is expected since our approaches
depend heavily on the existence of well-represented training
datasets. In the rare variants, however, the number of training
examples for the non-reference genotypes goes as low as 1 or
2 examples over 1,000 individuals. That is why we observed a
substantial decrease in the imputation power in our methods.
Interestingly, we observed that the more complex methods (Chi-
mera’s logistic regression and SNU’s neural network approach)
provided comparably better accuracy than the ordinary linear(F). Precision-recall curve for rare variants (G). The boxplots illustrate the super-p
(top) and un-common variants (bottom)
(H). ALL indicates the MAF distribution for all populations. The center and the t
distributions.
8 Cell Systems 12, 1–13, November 17, 2021model, which suggests that the more complex vicinity-based
models can perform more accurate imputation for rare variants.
In summary to this comparison, the rare variants represent
challenging cases and a limitation for vicinity-based secure
approaches.
It should be noted that a substantial portion of the rare variants
are shown to be population specific (Bomba et al., 2017). To test
for this, we analyzed the population specificity of the variants by
computing the population-specific AF of these variants. We
observed that most of the rare variants show enrichment in the
African populations (Figure 3H) with a median MAF of around
2%–3% for AFR. Compared with the rare variants, the common
variants showed a much more frequent and more uniform repre-
sentation among the populations. These results highlight that
rare variants can potentially be more accurately imputed using
population-specific panels, which is in concordance with previ-
ous studies (Kowalski et al., 2019). Finally, from the perspective
of downstream analyses, such as GWAS, high allele frequency
variants are much more useful, since even the highly powered
GWAS studies perform stringent MAF cutoffs at 2%–3% to
ensure that the causal variants are not false positives (Sung
et al., 2018).
Timing and memory requirements of secure imputation
methods
One of the main critiques of HE methods is that they are imprac-
tical due to memory and time requirements. Therefore, we
believe that themost important challenge is tomakeHEmethods
practical in terms of memory and time. To assess and demon-
strate the practicality of the secure methods, we performed a
detailed analysis of the time andmemory requirements of secure
imputation methods. We divided the imputation process into
four steps (key generation, encryption, secure model evaluation,
and decryption), andwemeasured the time and the overall mem-
ory requirements. Figure 4A shows the detailed time require-
ments for each step. In addition, we studied the scalability of
secure methods. For this, we report the time requirements for
20,000 (20K), 40,000 (40K), and 80,000 (80K) target variants to
present how the time requirements scale with the number of
target variants. The secure methods spend up to 10 ms for key
generation. In the encryption step, all methods were well below
2 s. The most time-consuming step of evaluation took less
than 10 s, even for the largest set of 80K variants. Decryption,
the last step, took less than 2 s. Except for the key generation
and encryption, all methods exhibited linear scaling with the
increasing number of target variants. Overall, the total time spent
in secure model evaluation took less than 25 s (Figure 4B). This
could be ignored when compared with the total time require-
ments of the non-secure imputation. Assuming that time usage
scales linearly with the number of target variants (Figure 3A), 4
million variants can be evaluated in approximately 1,250 s, which
is less than half an hour. In other terms, secure evaluation is
approximately 312 ms. per variant per 1,000 individuals ð25 s 3
1; 000 individualsÞ. It can be decreased even further by scalingopulation-specific minor allele frequency distribution (y axis) for the common
wo ends of the boxplots show the median and 25%–75% values of the MAF
A
B C
Figure 4. Memory and time requirements of the secure methods
(A–C) Eachmethod is divided into 4 steps: (1) key generation, (2) encryption, (3) evaluation, and (4) decryption. The bar plots show the time requirements (A) using
20K, 40K, and 80K target variant sets. The aggregated time (B) and the maximum memory usage of the methods are also shown (C).
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stances on cloud resources). In terms of memory usage, all
methods required less than 15 gigabytes of main memory, and
three of the five approaches required less than 5 gigabytes (Fig-
ure 4C). These results highlight the fact that secure methods
could be deployed on even the commodity computer systems.
The training of the methods on rare variants were performed to
ensure the assigned scores are best tuned for the unbalanced
training data in rare variants. The Chimera and SNU teams
(best performing methods) have a diverse range of requirementsfor secure evaluation where the neural network approach
(SNU) requires high resources, whereas the logistic regression
approach has much more practicable resource requirements
(Tables S9 and S10).
Resource usage comparison between secure and non-
secure imputation methods
An important aspect of practicality is whether the methods are
adaptable to different tag variants. This issue arises when a
new array platform is used for genotyping tag variants with aCell Systems 12, 1–13, November 17, 2021 9
A
B C
Figure 5. Comparison of time and memory
requirements of methods
(A– C) The secure outsourced imputation service (A),
time (B), and memory requirements (C) are illus-
trated in the bar plots where colors indicate security
context. The y axis shows the time (in seconds) and
main memory (in gigabytes) used by eachmethod to
perform the imputation of the 80K variants where the
secure outsourced method includes the plaintext
model training and secure model evaluation steps.
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framework requires that the plaintext models must be re-param-
etrized, and thismay require a large amount of time andmemory.
To evaluate this, we optimized the linear models for the UTMSR-
CKKS approach and measured the total time (training and eval-
uation) and the memory for the target variant set.
In order to make the comparisons fair with the HMM-based
methods, we included the rare variants and common variants
in this benchmark where the variants with MAF greater than
0.5% are used. In total, we used the 200,976 target variants in
this range. In this way, we believe that we perform a fair compar-
ison of resource usage with other non-secure methods. We
assumed that the training and secure evaluation would be run
sequentially, and we measured the time requirement of the
secure approach by summing the time for key generation,
encryption, secure evaluation, decryption, and the time for
training. For memory, we computed the peak memory required
for training and the peak memory required for secure evaluation.
These time and memory requirements provided us with an esti-
mate of the resources used by the secure pipeline (Figure 5A)
that can be fairly compared with the non-secure methods.
We measured the time and memory requirements of all the
methodsbyusingadedicatedcomputercluster toensure resource
requirements are measured accurately (see STAR Methods). For10 Cell Systems 12, 1–13, November 17, 2021IMPUTE2, therewasnooption for specifying
multiple threads. Hence, we divided the
sequenced portion of chromosome 22 into
16 regions and imputed variants in each re-
gion inparallel using IMPUTE2, as instructed
by the manual, i.e., we ran 16 IMPUTE2 in-
stances in parallel tocomplete the computa-
tion. We then measured the total memory
required by all 16 runs and used this as the
memory requirement by IMPUTE2. We
used the maximum time among all the 16
runs, as the time requirements by parallel-
ized IMPUTE2. Beagle, Minimac3, and
Minimac4 were run with 16 threads, as this
option was available in the command line.
In addition, Minimac4 requires model
parametrization and preprocessing of the
reference panel, which requires large CPU
time. Therefore, we included this step in
the timing requirements. Figures 5B and 5C
show the time and memory requirements,
respectively, of the three non-secure ap-
proaches and our secure method. The re-
sults show that the secure pipeline providescompetitive timing (2nd fastest after Beagle) and memory require-
ments (3rd in terms of least usage after Minimac3 and Minimac4).
Our results also show that Minimac3/Minimac4 and our secure
approach provided a good trade-off betweenmemory and timing,
because Beagle and IMPUTE2 exhibit the highest time or highest
memory requirements compared with other methods.
We also compared the secure models and found that different
secure models exhibit diverse accuracy depending on allele fre-
quency and position of variants (supplemental information).
DISCUSSION
We presented fully secure genotype imputation methods that
can practically scale to genome-wide imputation tasks by using
efficient HE techniques where the data are encrypted in transit, in
analysis, and at rest. This is a unique aspect of the HE-based
frameworks because, when appropriately performed, encryption
is one of the few approaches that are recognized at the legisla-
tive level as a way of secure sharing of biomedical data, e.g.,
by HIPAA (Wilson, 2006) and partially by GDPR (Hoofnagle
et al., 2019).
Our study was enabled by several key developments in the
fields of genomics and computer science. First, the recent theo-
retical breakthroughs in the HE techniques have enabled
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010massive increases in the speed of secure algorithms. Although
much of the data science community still regards HE as a theo-
retical and not-so-practical framework, the reality is far from this
image. We hope that our study can provide a reference for the
development of privacy-aware and fully secure approaches
that employ HE. Second, the amount of genomic data have
increased several orders of magnitude in recent years. This pro-
vides enormous genotype databases where we can train the
imputation models and test them in detail before implementing
them in secure evaluation frameworks. Another significant devel-
opment is the recent formation of genomic privacy communities
and alliances, i.e., Global Alliance for Genomic Health (GA4GH),
where researchers build interdisciplinary approaches for devel-
oping privacy-aware methods. For example, our international
study stemmed from the 2019 iDASH Genomic Privacy Chal-
lenge. We firmly believe that these communities will help bring
together further interdisciplinary collaborations for the develop-
ment of secure genomic analysis methods.
The presented imputation methods train an imputation model
for each target variant. Our approach handlesmillions of models,
i.e., parameters. Unlike the HMM models that can adapt seam-
lessly to a new set of tag variants (i.e., a new array platform),
our approaches need to be retrained when the tag variants are
updated. We expect that the training can be performed a-priori
for a new genotyping array and that it can be reused in the impu-
tation. The decoupling of the (1) plaintext training and (2) secure
evaluation steps is very advantageous, because plaintext
training can be independently performed at the third party
without the need to wait for the data to arrive. This way, the users
would have to accrue only the secure evaluation time, that is, as
our results show, much smaller compared with the time require-
ments of the non-secure models, as small as 312 ms per variant
per 1,000 individuals. Nevertheless, even with the training, our
results show that the secure imputation framework can train
and evaluate in run times comparable with plaintext (non-secure)
methods. In the future, we expect many optimizations can be
introduced to the models we presented. For example, we fore-
see that the linear model training can be replaced with more
complex feature selection and training methods. Deep neural
networks are potential candidates for imputation tasks, as they
can be trained for learning the complex haplotype patterns to
provide better imputation accuracy (Das et al., 2018). With the
introduction of the graphical processing units (GPUs) on the
cloud, these models can be trained and evaluated securely
and efficiently. It is, however, important to be thorough about
the security of the data because, as we mentioned before,
even the number of untyped target variants that the researcher
sends to the server can leak some information about the data-
sets. These stealthy leakages highlight the importance of using
semantic security approaches. It is important to note that the
secure evaluation steps implemented in our study replicate the
results of the plaintext models almost exactly, which indicates
that ‘‘HE-conversion’’ does not accrue any performance penalty.
Our study aims to spearhead the feasibility of secure genotype
imputation in a high-throughput manner. As such, there are
currently numerous limitations that must be overcome in future
studies (supplemental information). For example, our ap-
proaches provide suboptimal accuracy when compared with
non-secure methods, especially for rare variants. As wementioned earlier, we foresee that our methods can be opti-
mized in numerous ways. For instance, it has been previously
shown that the vicinity-based methods can make use of tag sin-
gle nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) selection to increase accu-
racy (Yu and Schaid, 2007). We are also foreseeing that new
methods can be adapted on the hard-to-impute regions (Duan
et al., 2013; Chen and Shi, 2019) to provide higher accuracy
for these regions with complex haplotype structures.
Finally, we believe that the multitude of models and the secure
evaluation approaches that we presented here can help provide
a much needed reference point for the development and
improvement of the imputation methods. Moreover, the devel-
oped models can be easily adapted to solve other privacy-sen-
sitive problems by using secure linear, logistic, and network
model evaluations, such as the secure rare variant association
tests (Wu et al., 2011). Therefore, we believe that our codebases
represent an essential resource for the computational genomics
community. We have organized the codebases to ensure that
they can be most accessible to the users without the necessary
cryptography expertise. We are hoping that our codebase can
provide a central role in the development of a community (similar
to dynverse (dynverse, n.d.) or TAPE (TAPE, n.d. 2019; Rao et al.,
2019) repositories for trajectory inference and protein embed-
ding, respectively) where users can use the developed methods
and datasets for uniform benchmarking of their new imputation
methods.
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Further information and requests for resources and reagents should be directed to and will be fulfilled by the lead contact, Arif Har-
manci (arif.o.harmanci@uth.tmc.edu).
Materials availability
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Variant and genotype datasets
All the tag and target variant loci, and the genotypes are collected from the public resources. We downloaded the Illumina Duo 1M
version 3 variant loci from the array’s specification at the Illumina web site (https://support.illumina.com/downloads/human1m-
duo_v3-0_product_files.html). The file was parsed to extract the variants on chromosome 22, which yielded 17,777 variants. We
did not use the CNVs and indels while filtering the variants and we focused only on the single nucleotide polymorphims (SNPs).
We then intersected these variants with the 1000Genomes variants on chromosome 22 to identify the array variants that are detected
by the 1000Genomes Project. We identified 16,184 variants from this intersection. This variant set represents the tag variants that are
used to perform the imputation. The phased genotypes on chromosome 22 for the 2,504 individuals in the 1000 Genomes Project are
downloaded from the NCBI portal (ftp://ftp-trace.ncbi.nih.gov/1000genomes/ftp/release/20130502/ALL.chr22.phase3_shapeit2_
mvncall_integrated_v5a.20130502.genotypes.vcf.gz). We filtered out the variants for which the allele frequency reported by the
1000 Genomes Project is less than 5%. After excluding the tag variants on the array platform, we identified 83,072 target variants
that are to be used for imputation. As the developed secure methods use vicinity variants, the variants at the ends of the chromo-
some are not imputed. We believe this is acceptable because these variants are located very close to the centromere and at the
very end of the chromosome. After filtering the non-imputed variants, we focused on the 80,882 variants that were used for consis-
tent benchmarking of all the secure and non-secure methods.
Accuracy benchmark metrics
We describe the genotype level and variant level accuracy. For each variant, we assign the genotype with the highest assigned ge-
notype probability. The variant level accuracy is the average variant accuracy where each variant’s accuracy is estimated based on
how well these imputed genotypes of the individuals match the known genotypes:e1 Cell Systems 12, 1–13.e1–e4, November 17, 2021
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Variant level accuracy is also referred to as the macro-aggregated accuracy.
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In the sensitivity vs positive predictive value (PPV) plots, the sensitivity and PPV are computed after filtering the imputed genotypes
with respect to the imputation probability. We compute the sensitivity at the probability cutoff of t is:
Senst =
P
ið# Correctly Imputed Individuals for Variant i whose genotype probability>tÞP
ið# of Individuals for Variant iÞ
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Next, we swept a large cutoff range for t from -5 to 5 with steps 0.01. We finally plotted the sensitivity versus PPV to generate the
precision-recall curves for each method.
Micro-AUC accuracy statistics
For parameterizing the accuracy and demonstrating how different parameters affect algorithm performance, we used micro-AUC as
the accuracy metric. This was also the original accuracy metric for measuring the algorithm performance in iDASH19 competition.
Micro-AUC treats the imputation problem as a three-level classification problem where each variant is ‘‘classified’’ into one of three
classes, i.e., genotypes, f0;1;2g. Micro-AUC computes an AUCmetric for each genotype then microaggregates the AUCs for all the
genotypes. This enables assigning one score to a multi-class classification problem. We use the implementation in scikit-learn pack-
age to measure the micro-AUC scores for each method (https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.metrics.
roc_auc_score.html).
Measurement of time and memory requirements
For consistently measuring the time and memory usage among all the benchmarked methods, we used /usr/bin/time -f %e ‘‘yt’’ %
M" to report the wall time (in seconds) and peak memory usage (in kilobytes) of each method.
Secure methods
We briefly describe the secure methods.
UTMSR-BFV and UTMSR-CKKS
The UTMSR (UTHealth-Microsoft Research) team uses a linear model with the nearby tag variants as features for each target variant.
The plaintext model training is performed using the GNUScientific Library. The collinear features are removed by performing the SVD
and removing features with singular values smaller than 0.01. The target variant genotype is modeled as a continuous variable that
represents the ‘‘soft’’ estimate of the genotype (or the estimated dosage of the alternate allele) and can take any value from negative
to positive infinity. The genotype probabilities are assigned by converting the soft genotype estimation to a score in the range [0,1]:
pðgÞ = expð  1 3 j~ggjÞ;g˛f0;1;2g; (Equation 1)
where g denotes one of the genotypes and ~g represents the decrypted value of the imputed genotype estimate. Suppose that each
variant genotype is modeled using genotypes of variants within k variant vicinity of the variant. In plaintext domain, the imputed value
can be written as follows:










w+j;r 3 gj + r

; (Equation 2)




j;r denote the linear model weights for the j
th target variant’s rth upstream
and downstream tag variants, respectively.
The secure outsourcing imputation protocols are implemented on two popular ring-based HE cryptosystems – BFV (Brakerski,
2012; Fan and Vercauteren, 2012) and CKKS (Cheon et al., 2017). These HE schemes share the same parameter setup and key-gen-
eration phase but have different algorithms for message encoding and homomorphic operations. In a nutshell, a ciphertext is gener-
ated by adding a random encryption of zero to an encoded plaintext, which makes the ring-based HE schemes secure under theCell Systems 12, 1–13.e1–e4, November 17, 2021 e2
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010RLWE assumption. More precisely, each tag variant is first encoded as a polynomial with its coefficients, and the encoded plaintext is
encrypted into a ciphertext using the underlying HE scheme. The plaintext polynomial in the BFV scheme is separated from an error
polynomial (inserted for security), whereas the plaintext polynomial in the CKKS scheme embraces the error. Then Equation 2 is ho-
momorphically evaluated on the encrypted genotype data by using the plain weight parameters. We exploit parallel computation on
multiple individual data, and hence it enables us to obtain the predicted genotype estimates over different samples at a time. Our
experimental results indicate that the linear model with 32 tag variants as features for each target variant shows the most balanced
performance in terms of timing and imputation accuracy in the current testing dataset (see Table S8 and Figure S5). Our protocols
achieve at least a 128-bit security level from the HE standardization workshop paper (Albrecht et al., 2018). We defer the complete
details to the ‘‘UTHealth-Microsoft Research team solution’’ section in the supplementary document.
Chimera-TFHE
The Chimera team used multi-class logistic regression (logreg) models trained over one-hot encoded tag features: each tag SNP
variant is mapped to 3 Boolean variables. Chimera’s model training and architecture performed the best (with respect to accuracy
and resource requirement) among six other solutions in the iDASH2019 Genotype Imputation Challenge.
We build three models per target SNP (one model per variant), i.e., target SNPs are also one-hot-encoded. These models give the
probabilities for each target SNP variant. The maximal probability variant is the imputed target SNP value. A fixed number d of the
nearest tag SNPs (in relation to the current target SNP) are used in model building. We train the models with different values of d in
order to study the influence of neighborhood size: from 5 to 50 neighbors with an increment of 5. Themost accuratemodel, in terms of
micro-AUC score, is obtained for a neighborhood size d = 45. The fastest model with an acceptable accuracy (micro AUC> 0:99) is
obtained for d = 10. Although, the execution time of the fastest model is onlyz2 times faster compared to the most accurate model
(refer to Table S2 ).
During the homomorphic evaluation, only the linear part of the logreg model is executed, which means in particular that we do not
homomorphically apply the sigmoid function on the output scores. We use the coefficient packing strategy and pack as many plain-
text values as possible in a single ciphertext. Themaximum number of values that can be packed in a RingLWE ciphertext equals the
used ring dimension, which is n= 1024 in our solution. We chose to pack one or several columns of the input (tag SNPs) into a single
ciphertext. Since the TFHE libraryRingLWE ciphertexts encrypt polynomials with Torus (T = Rmod1) coefficients, we downscale the
data to Torus values (multiples of 214) and upscale the model coefficients to integers.
In our solution, we use linear combinations with public integer coefficients. The evaluation is based on the security of LWE and only
the encryption phase uses RingLWE security notions with no additional bootstrapping or key-switching keys. The security param-
eters have been tuned to support binary keys. Of course, as neither bootstrapping nor key-switching is used in our solution, the key
distribution can be changed to any distribution (including the full domain distribution) without any time penalty. Our scheme achieves
130 bits of security, according to the LWE estimator (Albrecht et al., 2015). More information about the our solution is described in the
supplementary document (‘‘Chimera-TFHE team solution’’).
EPFL-CKKS
EPFL uses amultinomial logistic regression model with d  1 neighboring coefficients and 1 intercept variable for each target variant,
with three classes {0,1,2}. The plaintext model is trained using the scikit-learn python library. The input variants are represented
as values {0,1,2}. There is no pre-processing applied to the training data. For a target position j, the predicted probabilities for each




























where fwð,;j;gÞ0 ;.;wð,;j;gÞd1 g are the trained regression coefficients for label g˛f0;1;2g and position j, and fzðp;j;,Þ1 ;.; zðp;j;,Þd1 g are the
neighboring variants for patient p around target position j. The hard prediction for position j is given by yðp;j;gÞ = argmaxgðP½y =
g
zðp;jÞr Þ. The variants fzðp;j;,Þ1 ;.; zðp;j;,Þd1 g are sent encrypted and packed to the server, using the CKKS homomorphic cryptosystem,
and the exponents in Equation 3 are computed homomorphically. The client decrypts the result and can obtain the label probabilities
and hard predictions for each position. For the prediction, we use several numbers of regression coefficients, ranging from 8 to 64; as
this number increases, both the obtained accuracy and the computational complexity increase (see Table S6). We use a single
parametrization of the cryptosystem (see the ‘‘EPFL-Lattigo team solution’’ section in the supplemental information) for all the regres-
sion sizes, which keeps the cipher expansion asymptotically constant. The security of this solution is based on the hardness of the
RLWE problem with Gaussian secrets.
SNU-CKKS
The SNU team applies one-hidden layer neural network for the genotype imputation. The model is obtained from Tensorflowmodule
in plain (unencrypted) state, and the inference phase is progressed in encrypted stated for given test SNP data encrypted by the
CKKS HE scheme. We encode each ternary SNP data into a 3-dimensional binary vector, i.e., 0/ð1;0;0Þ, 1/ð0;1;0Þ and 2/
ð0; 0; 1Þ. For better performance in terms of both accuracy and speed, we utilize an inherent property that each target SNP is mostlye3 Cell Systems 12, 1–13.e1–e4, November 17, 2021
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tems (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cels.2021.07.010related by its adjacent tag SNPs.We set the number of the adjacent tag SNPs as a pre-determined parameter d, and run experiments
on various choices of the parameter (d = 8k for 1%k%9). As a result, we check that d = 40 shows the best accuracy in terms of micro-
AUC. Since the running time of computing genotype score grows linear to d, the fastest result is obtained at d = 8. We refer the in-
termediate value d = 24 to the most balanced choice in terms of accuracy and speed.
The security of the utilized CKKS scheme relies on the hardness of solving the RLWE problem with ternary (signed binary) secret.
For the security estimation, we applied the LWE estimator (Albrecht et al., 2015), a sage module that computes the computational
costs of state-of-art (R)LWE attack algorithms. The script for the security estimation is attached as a figure in the ‘‘SNU team solution’’
section in the supplementary document.
Non-secure methods
We describe the versions and the details of how the non-secure methods were run. The benchmarks were performed on a Linux
workstation with 769 Gigabytes of main memory on an Intel Xeon Platinum 8168 CPU at 2.7 GHz with 96 cores. No other tools
were run in the course of benchmarks.
Beagle
We obtained the jar formatted Java executable file for Beagle version 5.1 from the Beagle web site. The population panel (1,500 in-
dividuals) and the testing panel data are converted into VCF file format as required by Beagle. We ran Beagle using the chromosome
22 maps provided from the web site. The number of threads is specified as 16 threads at the command line (option ‘nthreads=16’).
We set the ‘gp’ and ‘ap’ flags in the command line to explicitly ask Beagle to save genotype probabilities that are used for building the
sensitivity versus PPV curves. Beagle supplies the per genotype probabilities for each imputed variant. These probabilities were used
in plotting the curves.
IMPUTE2
IMPUTE2 is downloaded from the IMPUTE2 website. The haplotype, legend, genotype, and the population panels are converted into
specific formats that are required by IMPUTE2.We could not find a command line option to run IMPUTE2 withmultiple threads. To be
fair, we divided the sequenced portion of the chromosome 22 (from 16,000,000 to 51,000,000 base pairs) into 16 equally spaced
regions of length 2.333 megabases. Next, we ran 16 different IMPUTE2 instances in parallel, as described in the IMPUTE2 manual.
The output from the 16 runs is pooled to evaluate the imputation accuracy of IMPUTE2. IMPUTE2 provides per genotype probabil-
ities, which were used for plotting the precision-recall curves.
Minimac3 and Minimac4
Minimac3 and Minimac4 are downloaded from the University of Michigan web site. We next downloaded Eagle 2.4.1 phasing soft-
ware for phasing input genotypes. ‘‘Eagle+Minimac3’’ and ‘‘Eagle+Minimac4’’ were used in the Michigan Imputation Server’s pipe-
line that is served for the public use. The panels are converted into indexed VCF files as required by Eagle, Minimac3, and Minimac4.
We first used the Eagle protocol to phase the input genotypes. The phased genotypes are supplied to Minimac3 and Minimac4, and
final imputations are performed. Eagle, Minimac3, andMinimac4were runwith 16 threads using the command line options (‘–numTh-
reads=16’ and ‘–cpus 16’ options for Eagle andMinimac3, respectively). Minimac3 andMinimac4 reports an estimated dosage of the
alternate allele, which we converted to a score as in the above equation for UTMSR’s scoring.
Minimac4 algorithm requires a preprocessing of the reference haplotype with a parameter estimation step. We observed that the
parameter estimation step add a substantial amount of processing time and Minimac4 requires the parameter estimates to perform
imputation.
Data and code availability
d Source data statement. Accuracy and resource benchmarking related source data have been deposited at https://doi.org/10.
5281/zenodo.4947832. The 1000 Genomes project dataset are publicly available fromNCBI portal at NCBI:ftp://ftp-trace.ncbi.
nih.gov/1000genomes/ftp/release/20130502/ALL.chr22.phase3_shapeit2_mvncall_integrated_v5a.20130502.genotypes.vcf.
gz). The Illumino array platform metadata is available from https://support.illumina.com/downloads/human1m-duo_v3-
0_product_
files.html.
d Code statement. The original source code, documentation, and usage examples for the imputation models are deposited at
github: https://github.com/K-miran/secure-imputation and are also archived and deposited at https://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.4948000.
d Scripts statement. The source and scripts for generating the figures and associated instructions are archived and deposited
under https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4947832 and are co-located with the figure-related datasets.
d Any additional information required to reproduce this work is available from the lead contact.Cell Systems 12, 1–13.e1–e4, November 17, 2021 e4
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Description of the iDASH19 Challenge Setup and Results
Our study is inspired by the 2019 iDASH Genomic Privacy Challenge for the development of secure tools to enable genotype
imputation (Fig. 1). Before the challenge, the organizers put together a training dataset with the tag and target variants, which
served as the challenge dataset. The dataset was later distributed to all the participants, who were tasked with building the
imputation models and implementing secure versions of them. Each team submitted their models as docker images to the
organizers before the closing of the challenge. There were more than 49 registrations from all around the globe and the
organizers received 6 final submissions with solutions. The organizers then benchmarked all the submitted methods on a
separate dataset that had been withheld from the participants. Based on the encouraging results from the participants, the top 3
performing teams (Chimera, EPFL, SNU) and the organizer team (UTHealth and Microsoft Research) collaborated to do large
scale testing and development of the imputation methods.
In the iDASH competition, we aimed at testing the feasibility of developing secure imputation models. To ensure that the
task was solvable in a limited amount of time, we focused on two regions on chromosome 1 (chr1:15812664-25811728 and
chr1:186118607-196115993) with medium heterozygosity and gene density (for exclusion of regions under high selection
pressure), where two training datasets were developed. The first dataset contained 9,746 tag Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms
(SNPs) and the second contained 1,045 tag SNPs. Both datasets were used to predict genotypes of 500 target SNPs. Since
both variant sets span the same region, the first dataset had lower variant-variant distance (approximately 1900 base pairs),
i.e., higher density of tag variants compared to the second region (approximately 18,000 base pairs). Hence, the first dataset,
denoted by 1K (name referring to the average distance between consecutive tag variants), represents an easier imputation task
1
compared to the second one, denoted by 10K. The results of the challenge are summarized in Supplementary Table 1.
Supplementary Table 1. The micro-AUC and timing benchmarks for the methods compared in the iDASH19 Genomic
Privacy Homomorphic Encryption Challenge.
Team Dataset Model Accuracy Memory Time (seconds)
(GB) Encryption Evaluation Decryption Total
Chimera-TFHE 1K 1Ka 0.9971 0.1542 2.6761 0.9583 0.2062 3.8406
1Kb 0.9971 0.1500 2.6441 0.7063 0.1991 3.5496
1Kc 0.9971 0.1541 2.6167 0.9702 0.1992 3.7860
10K 10Ka 0.9763 0.0339 0.3047 0.2310 0.1978 0.7334
10Kb 0.9763 0.0363 0.3099 0.3146 0.1933 0.8179
10Kc 0.9759 0.0382 0.3063 0.4202 0.1971 0.9236
SNU 1K 1Ka 0.9966 0.9023 53.9480 102.6470 2.0912 158.6862
10K 10Ka 0.9729 0.5943 5.7560 107.8530 1.8613 115.4703
10Kb 0.9750 0.6088 5.7150 43.6859 1.9330 51.3339
EPFL 1K 1Ka 0.9930 0.6614 7.2200 2.3500 0.6400 10.1870
1Kb 0.9936 4.3152 13.0700 8.2900 0.8600 21.8590
1Kc 0.9932 1.6825 8.3700 4.8900 0.4600 13.7600
10K 10Ka 0.9682 1.7017 7.8100 2.2300 0.5100 10.5840
10Kb 0.9705 4.2926 13.1300 8.0200 0.7900 22.8740
10Kc 0.9688 1.7017 8.4700 4.9500 0.4700 13.9200
section*Genotype Imputation Problem and Security Guarantees We describe the main focus of the genotype imputation
problem and the security guarantees provided by the secure schemes. Focus on the Unphased Genotype Imputation. In the
genotype imputation scenario, it is important to highlight the fact that we are solving the "unphased genotype imputation
problem". This is important to highlight because the current state-of-the-art non-secure methods (such as Minimac3, Minimac41)
impute the variants when the phased genotypes are available, which means that the genotypes must be phased into maternal
Supplementary Figure 1. Overview of the secure imputation scenario.
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and paternal chromosomes using, for example, EAGLE2 before they can be imputed using, for example, Minimac3. From
the privacy and security perspective, the phasing step must be also protected and requires high computational resources to
accomplish. To provide a complete privacy framework and security of the genotype data, we aim at imputing the target variant
genotypes directly from the unphased genotypes so that there is no need for a separate phasing step where genotypes are sent
to another untrusted semi-honest entity. It is worth noting that our approaches currently do not handle the phased genotype
imputation problems but they can be adapted for phased genotype imputation after proper re-training of the models for this
problem. This requires, however, changes in model architectures and data representation and we view this as a separate task
from our current focus in this study.
As we describe in detail below, we developed a number of secure imputation methods. In this study, we focus primarily
on linear imputation models that can be trained very fast, using optimized libraries 3. One of the key points of secure and
privacy-preserving imputation is that the parameters of the imputation models can be stored openly (or in “plaintext”) without
the need of protection as they depend only on the population panels that are publicly available. Thus, the imputation server can
train the imputation models without requiring secure computations. Using the optimized scientific libraries, the linear models
can be trained very efficiently. This way, the imputation can be performed at near real-time training potential in the case that
the model parameters need to be trained when a new set of tag variants are used in the imputation. This is necessary when a
user provides a custom-built array platform 4 that the server did not process previously and the imputation models are trained
from scratch. To utilize the trained imputation models for each SNP in the course of imputation, the arithmetic operations of
the imputation model are securely and efficiently computed, where one of the operands (the genotype) is encrypted and the
model parameters are plaintext (Fig. 1b, 1c). We briefly describe our methodological approaches.
Imputation Security Guarantees. We focus on three different types of homomorphic encryption "schemes", namely the
BFV 5, 6, CKKS 7, and TFHE 8 schemes, and we provide implementations of the imputation models that use these schemes.
These schemes use different variants of a basic principle named "lattice-based hardness assumption" to provide security
guarantees while the genotype imputation is performed. In more formal terms, these schemes provide indistinguishability of
the encrypted data under "chosen plaintext attacks" (termed IND-CPA condition9), which is a standard security notion that
guarantees confidentiality of the data. It should be noted that there are many more approaches and guarantees for security and
confidentiality of the data (such as authenticated encryption, which provides confidentiality and integrity of ciphertexts) but
these may be incompatible with HE-based frameworks. These formalisms should be considered in future studies. The CPA
attacks represent scenarios where the attacker (or a cryptanalyst) can use the publicly available key to encrypt carefully selected
messages to generate encrypted data and analyze the characteristics of the encryption to reveal information about the encryption
schemes, such as non-uniformity of encrypted messages, which can leak information about sensitive data. Previous research
has shown that the lattice-based systems guarantee the indistinguishability (and security) condition because it is practically
infeasible for a computationally bounded adversary to decrypt encrypted data without the access to the private key. The different
schemes provide different interfaces and differences in details of the implementation of this basic principle.
Alternative Security Approach by “Model Sharing”. In the imputation scenarios considered here, it should be noted that the
variant positions are passed between the server and the researcher in plaintext format. This can potentially lead to information
leakage. For instance, the number of target variants can leak the information about the technology that was used for genotyping
and potentially reveal the identity of the researchers or the research institution. These types of attacks are very subtle and
highlight the need for formal approaches such as HE to encrypt all the data. One practical way to ensure these leakages are
patched is to ensure that the tag and target variants are standardized. Usage of standard array platforms is one way to do this:
The tag variants are standardized and the targets are defined by the publicly available reference panels. This is also useful
for non-secure imputation methods since imputation across genotyping platforms was shown to induce biases because of the
difference in the used tag SNPs10. The authors argue that the best strategy for mitigation of these biases is to use the common
tag variants across arrays, which is similar to standardization of the used tag variants.
Similarly, one approach that a client can take is to download the models that are trained by the imputation server and
evaluate them locally for imputing variants. This idea resembles "model sharing" paradigms for protecting privacy11. This is
also useful since the models have a much smaller footprint compared to the reference panels. Especially when the imputation is
performed on a small region and a few genomes, downloading the imputation models and local plaintext evaluation approach
can prove practical. This, however, requires the server to make the newly trained models available for download. To follow
up the local imputation scenario, it should be noted that the implemented approaches are platform independent and do not
require a specific hardware platform, unlike other approaches such as Intel’s Secure Guard Extensions (SGX) or AMD’s Secure
Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), which require specific hardware on both the server and client sides. These approaches provide
a security-by-engineering (with potential side-channel and hypervisor vulnerabilities) approach unlike HE and MPC approaches
that provide theoretical security of the data.
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Comparison of the Secure Methods
To compare the performance of the proposed models, we first analyzed how the accuracy changes over the genome. Supplemen-
tary Figure 8a shows the distribution of accuracy over chromosome 22 coordinates. We observed that the methods show similar
trends of accuracy over the chromosome. We also observed that there are certain spans of consecutive variants that are harder to
impute consistently among different methods. Evaluating the accuracy among different methods, UTMSR-LMSE’s ordinary
linear method shows a wide range of accuracy values compared to other methods. This is more clear when we evaluate the
MAF vs the accuracy of different methods (Supplementary Figure 8b). From this, the ordinary linear method shows more
outliers which highlights the sporadically less accurate performance of the ordinary linear model. Interestingly EPFL’s logistic
regression method (one of the best overall methods) exhibited a patch of variants with very low MAF that were of low accuracy.
These results highlight the fact that trained models show a diverse range of accuracies. We next went on to perform pairwise
comparisons of methods (Supplementary Figure 8c). UTMSR-LMSE’s wide range of accuracies are better visualized in this
figure (bottom row in Supp. Figure 8c). Overall, EPFL’s logistic regression imputation performs favorably in comparison to the
other methods.
In summary, each method shows a variety of accuracy values depending on MAF and genomic location. We, therefore,
would like to point out that this recommendation should be taken mildly as these methods can be further improved and fine-tuned
by tag SNP selection12 and methods such as ensembling. For instance, we observed that the average accuracy increases around
0.5% (95.3% to 95.8%) when we computed accuracy using the best imputer at each variant. While this is an overly optimistic
estimation of the accuracy, it suggests that combining different approaches can provide higher accuracy. Also, we observed that
logistic regression-based methods can be trained to perform better than other methods that our teams trained for the variants
with low allele frequencies (Figure 2k). We believe our results suggest it is necessary to improve these models to observe some
of the expected gains in accuracy. This is one of the current major limitations of our approach to imputation and should be
further investigated in the future.
When we compare the methods in terms of their resource usages, the ordinary linear model is, as expected, required the
least amount of time and memory. It is interesting, however, that the resource requirements of the logistic regression methods
(Chimera and EPFL) and the simple neural networks method (SNU) are very feasible for secure evaluation purposes. We
foresee that these methods can be engineered to provide feasible performance for real-time training and evaluation for genotype
imputation purposes. In fact, our teams have not made use of numerous optimizations such as clustering of the nearby target
variants to increase the imputation speed and optimizing the model complexity at sites with lower recombination rates. The
HMM-based methods naturally optimize performance in these regions by techniques such as state-collapsing13.
Discussions about Limitations of HE-based Imputation Methods
We briefly describe and discuss the limitations of the HE-based imputation methods.
Firstly, there are inherent limitations in Homomorphic Encryption schemes that must be overcome by the theoreticians. For
instance, HE schemes are still limited practically by the multiplicative depth of an evaluation circuit. We are, however, very
hopeful that a lot of these challenges can be overcome by new schemes and approaches. Our motivation for this is the fact that
HE schemes have made seen big progress in the last decade, more than 5 orders of magnitude improvement has been achieved
since the inception of the HE computations. These limitations can partially be overcome by re-engineering and re-factoring
the imputation algorithms but this again requires much in-depth analysis of the algorithms and cross-disciplinary expertise
in genomics and cryptography. The second limitation stems from the complexity of homomorphic encryption algorithms.
Expertise in these fields requires substantial training in the fields of computer science and mathematics. This makes it necessary
to put a large interdisciplinary team together to develop new imputation algorithms.
Third, unlike the HMM-based methods that rely on the reference panels, the training of our vicinity-based methods needs to
be performed on the fly. This can be particularly compute-intensive for methods such as neural networks. Thus, our results on
resource requirements can be overly optimistic. We, however, have observed that the logistic regression currently performs
fairly well and plaintext-training of these models can be performed fairly fast. These methods can enable a good performance
accuracy tradeoff in training and secure evaluation.
Approaches of the Imputation Methods and Cryptographic Innovations
UTHealth-MSR.
Innovations in Plaintext training. We have developed the ordinary least squares model training using GNU Scientific Libraries
(GSL) in C++ to optimize the memory/time usage. We used the singular value decomposition (SVD) to remove the collinearities
of the tag variant genotypes before training of the ordinary least squares (OLS) models.
Innovations in Cryptography. We proposed a general and unified solution to evaluate a linear prediction model for genotype
imputation, which can be applied to two popular HE cryptosystems – BFV and CKKS. We exploit the single instruction multiple
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data (SIMD) representation in which each variant of the predictor tag genotypes is encoded as a polynomial with its coefficients
and encrypted using the underlying HE scheme. Based on our optimized encryption method, homomorphic computation is
performed over encrypted genotype data by simple constant-ciphertext multiplications using the plain real-valued regression
coefficients of the linear prediction models.
Chimera.
Innovations in Plaintext training. We trained all the models for our experiments by using state-of-the-art logistic regression on
one-hot encoded features, i.e., by mapping each tag and target SNP to 3 independent scores. The trainings have been done by
using the Vowpal Wabbit14 machine learning system.
Innovations in Cryptography. In order to perform the homomorphic evaluation, we interpreted the trained models as plain linear
regression (instead of logistic regression) models. This trick allowed us to avoid the evaluation of the sigmoid function on the
output scores, by keeping an excellent accuracy in the predictions. We also took advantage of the polynomial packing of the
RingLWE ciphertexts in the TFHE scheme in order pack multiple SNP in a single ciphertext, resulting in an improvement of
the homomorphic evaluation, both in terms of execution time and ciphertext sizes. We encoded the cleartext trained model
in a sparse matrix: the sparsity is due to the fact that most of the scores only depend on a small number of neighbours SNPs.
Thanks to all of this improvements, the final homomorphic imputation is performed by simply doing constant-ciphertexts
multiplications and leveled additions.
EPFL.
Innovations in Plaintext training. We relied on a standard baseline approach for the training process, in order to show that
simple logistic regression models that can be efficiently evaluated with homomorphic encryption already provide an accuracy
that is close to non-secure state-of-the-art solutions.
Innovations in Cryptography. Based on the prior knowledge of which computations have to be performed for prediction, we
optimized the encoding of the to-be-encrypted values and we achieved a 2× gain on the number of values that can be packed in
a single ciphertext. We also halved the amount of data that has to be sent from the client to the server by only sending "seeds"
of polynomials to the server, which can deterministically generate the corresponding complete polynomials.
SNU.
Innovations in Plaintext training. We trained a neural network with one hidden-layer using public python machine learning
library keras. We experimentally set the best choices on the number of nodes (64) in the hidden layer, and use a linear activation
function for hidden layer and Sigmoid for output layer. A linear activation function derives better accuracy than the others such
as ReLU and Sigmoid. In addition, each SNP feature is one-hot encoded as a vector to obtain an independent score for each
feature, which also shows better accuracy comparing the model without the one-hot encoding.
Innovations in Cryptography. Since our model is trained with a linear activation function for the hidden layer, it is evaluated by
a simple matrix multiplication followed by Sigmoid function. For homomorphic evaluation, we omit the last Sigmoid evaluation
by observing that the order of scores is unchanged by Sigmoid. We also use a trick that halves the number of ciphertexts by
encoding two real numbers into one complex number, and using CKKS scheme that supports encryption of complex numbers.
Description of the Security Guarantees for Homomorphic Encryption Systems
After the first plausible construction of HE15, this family of cryptosystems has progressed significantly towards both basing the
security on more standard assumptions and improving their efficiency. Currently, the ring-based HE schemes, such as BFV5, 6,
CKKS7, and TFHE8, have shown good performance on real-world problems. Throughout the paper, we assume that n is a
power-of-two integer and R = Z[X ]/(Xn +1). We write Rq = R/(q ·R) for the residue ring of R modulo an integer q. The Ring
Learning with Errors (RLWE) assumption with parameters (n,q,χ,ψ) states that given any polynomial number of samples of
the form (ai,bi = s ·ai +ei) ∈ R2q, where ai is uniformly random in Rq, s is chosen from the key distribution χ over Rq, and ei is
drawn from the error distribution ψ over R, the bi’s are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random elements of
Rq. Then, the ring-based HE schemes are IND-CPA secure if the RLWE problem of secret s with parameter (n,q,χ,ψ) is hard.
Chimera-TFHE Team Solution
In this section, we describe the solution of the Chimera-TFHE team (ranked 1st at the iDASH 2019 competition). In this
solution, we use the fully homomorphic encryption library TFHE8 and its Chimera leveled homomorphic encryption variant16
(more precisely, we apply approximate number encoding over the torus).
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Method overview
All the models are trained in plain by performing a multi-class logistic regression (logreg) over one-hot encoded features: each
tag SNP variant is mapped to three Boolean variables (either if SNP is homozygous, heterozygous or homozygous alternate).
We build three models per target SNP (one model per variant), i.e., target SNPs are also one-hot-encoded. A fixed number d of
the nearest tag SNPs (in relation to the current target SNP) are used in model building. To study the influence of neighborhood
size, we train the models with different values of d: from 5 to 50 neighbors with a 5 increment. The number of regression
coefficients of a model is equal to 3×d plus one coefficient for the intercept part. In this way, the size of obtained models is
under control and over-fitting is limited. Like in standard logistic regression multi-class predictor, the output class between
the three target SNP variant models is the one having the maximal score. The Vowpal Wabbit1 machine learning system with
default configuration parameters is used for training the logreg models.
During the homomorphic evaluation only the linear part of the logreg model is executed, which means in particular that we
do not homomorphically apply the sigmoid function on the output scores. The scores produced by our implementation can be
positive or negative and are used directly in the evaluation of method performance.
Plaintext Version We start by describing the plaintext version of the imputation algorithm followed by the actual implementa-
tion of this algorithm on encrypted data. We denote by 3 ·L the number of input features (one-hot encoded tag SNP values of
L tag SNPs), by M the number of samples (individuals) and by 3 ·T the number of target SNPs to predict (one-hot-encoded
target SNP values for T target SNPs). Indeed, each tag or target SNP has 3 possible values (0, 1 or 2), which are treated as
independent features.
The inputs to the algorithm are
• X = (X [i][ j])i∈[M], j∈[3L] – contains the input features as Boolean values, i.e. the one-hot-encoded tag SNPs for each
individual.
• W = (W [ j][k]) j∈[3L],k∈[3T ] – contains the coefficients of the model, given as a sparse matrix because each target SNP
model depends only on a small fixed number d of neighbour tag SNPs.
The evaluation of all the models consists in a multiplication between these two matrices, that is to say Y = X ·W where
Y = (Y [i][k])i∈[M],k∈[3T ] is the matrix of scores for each target SNP variant. Naturally, the sparseness of the matrix W is taken
into account in the actual implementation.
Ciphertext Version In the encrypted evaluation of the regression models, the coefficient matrix W is public and the matrix
of tag SNP variants X is encrypted. RingLWE homomorphic encryption schemes enable us to pack many plaintext messages
into a single ciphertext using different packing strategies (e.g., slot or coefficient). We use the coefficient packing strategy and
pack as many plaintext values as possible into a single ciphertext. The maximum number of values that can be packed into
a RingLWE ciphertext equals the used ring dimension, which is n = 1024 in our solution. We chose to pack one or several
columns of matrix X into a single ciphertext (per tag SNP packing). The exact number of columns we pack is B = ⌊n/M⌋,
which is the maximal integral number of matrix X columns that can be packed into a ciphertext.
Since the TFHE library RingLWE ciphertexts encrypt polynomials with Torus (T= R mod 1) coefficients, we downscale
the data X to Torus values (multiples of 2−14) and upscale the model coefficients W to integers. The downscale and upscale
ratios are chosen so that the plaintext evaluation Y = X ·W on training data does not overflow over the Torus (our model outputs
are bounded to a 1/2 range to leave a 100% safety margin).
In the iDASH 2019 competition dataset, since the number of lines of the input matrix X is M = 500, we extended our
encoding to pack B = 2 entire columns of X into a single RingLWE ciphertext: The first column is typically placed in the first
500 coefficients of the encrypted polynomial, while the second column is encoded in the next 500 coefficients. The remaining
coefficients in the polynomial are unused (in practice, set to 0).
The pseudo-code of the imputation algorithm on encrypted data is given in Algorithm 1. The input matrix X coefficient
encrypted in a RingLWE ciphertext are X [.][B · j,B · j+1, . . . ,B · ( j+1)−1] for j ∈ [3L/B]. The regression coefficients W are
given in clear form. The prediction scores are also RingLWE ciphertexts with the first M coefficients set to individual’s scores
and the others random. The algorithm is straightforward, encrypted input features are multiplied by plaintext model coefficients.
Temporary ciphertexts (line 2) are used to manage B columns of the matrix X independently. Each such ciphertext contains a
part of the final score. Rotated versions of these ciphertexts are added together to obtain final scores (line 10). Finally, we
randomize coefficients of output ciphertext (line 11) to avoid information leakage other than regression scores. Each of the
obtained 3T RingLWE(Y [.][k]) ciphertexts contains the prediction for one target SNP variant for all individuals.
1https://github.com/VowpalWabbit/vowpal_wabbit, version 8.5.0
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Algorithm 1 Homomorphic Evaluation.
Require: Input features RingLWE(X [.][B · j, . . . ,B · ( j+1)−1]) for j ∈ [3L/B] ▷ For simplicity we suppose that B|3 ·L
Require: Regression coefficients W [ j][k] in clear for j ∈ [3L] and k ∈ [3T ]
Ensure: Prediction scores RingLWE(Y [.][k]) for k ∈ [3T ]
1: for k = 0, . . . ,3T −1 do
2: Y0[.] = 0,Y1[.] = 0, . . . ,YB−1[.] = 0 ▷ Initialize B temporary values
3: for j = 0, . . . ,3L/B−1 do
4: for l = 0, . . . ,B−1 do
5: if W [ j+ l][k] ̸= 0 then




10: RingLWE(Y [.][k]) = RingLWE(Y0[.])+RingLWE(Y1[.]) ·X−M + . . .+RingLWE(YB−1[.]) ·X−(B−1)·M
11: RingLWE(Y [M, . . . ,n][k]) = 0 ▷ Randomize unused coefficients
12: end for
Parameters and Security
The practical parameters we chose to instantiate in the RingLWE encryption are n = 1024, the ring dimension and the size of
the binary secret key, and α = 2−25, the standard deviation used to sample the initial Gaussian noise in the ciphertexts. Our
scheme achieves 130 bits of security, according to the LWE estimator17.
Experimental Results
Learning plaintext logistic regression models (i.e. matrix W coefficients) was performed on a machine with an Intel Xeon CPU
@ 2.0GHz processor, with 64GB of RAM, using 8 execution threads. Learning time is between 7 and 10 hours, from smallest
to largest vicinity size (tag SNPs neighbourhood size). The number of obtained logreg models is more than 240k (= 3 ·T ) for
each vicinity value. The disk space for archived models is between 24MB and 158MB.
We have homomorphically executed the logreg models for different number of target SNPs (20k, 40k and 80k), different
number of tag SNP neighbourhood sizes and population stratification (AFR, AMR and EUR). The tests were performed on a
machine with an Intel Xeon Platinum 8168 Processor @ 2.7GHz, 64G RAM using 16 threads. The training and evaluation
phases code is publicly available on github https://github.com/ssmiler/idash2019_2.
Table 2 presents execution metrics2 as a function of number of target SNPs (column “#target SNPs”) and vicinity size
(column “#closest tag SNPs”). The HE key generation time (column “Keygen”) is a one-time process and independent on the
encrypted data or the executed computation. This column contains three values only for aesthetic reasons. The encryption and
decryption times are independent of the regression model (same value in columns “Encr.” and “Decr.”) and depend only on the
number of target SNPs. We chose to depict only the total RAM memory used during the evaluation phase (column “Evaluation
RAM (GB)”) because it is the largest one of the four steps. In the worst case, the evaluation phase uses less than 6GB of RAM.
The sizes of encrypted data (tag SNP variants) and result (target scores) is given in the last two columns. In the context of cloud
HE-based imputation, column “Input data size (MB)” represents the size of data to upload to the cloud and column “Score data
size (MB)” the size of result to download from the cloud. As expected, the evaluation time (column “Eval.”) increases with the
vicinity size in a linear manner.
In table 3 are shown accuracy metrics as a function of vicinity size and population stratification. Table lines (labeled “All”,
“AFR”, “AMR” and “EUR”) represent the stratification of the population. The metrics were computed on the test partition of
the input data. We can observe logreg model over-fitting after a certain vicinity size, e.g., models obtain worse accuracy metrics
for a vicinity larger that 25 for “AMR” and “EUR” stratification.
Using the values in tables 2 and 3 one can find the best compromise between model accuracy and evaluation time.
Table 4 illustrates the acceleration capability of our solution for different number of execution cores. Logistic regression
imputation model with a vicinity of 10 tag SNPs is used.
2Serialization time is not included in the illustrated timings. We note that the serialization takes about 60-80 % of the total execution time.
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Supplementary Table 2. Experimental results of HE-based genotype imputation – Team TFHE-Chimera.
#target #closest Time (sec.) Evaluation Input data Score data








10 0.563 0.913 0.72
15 0.772 1.122 0.81
20 0.873 1.223 0.87
25 0.983 1.334 0.92
30 1.175 1.526 1.05
35 1.315 1.665 1.11
40 1.462 1.812 1.16
45 1.611 1.961 1.22








10 1.202 1.925 1.46
15 1.631 2.354 1.65
20 1.917 2.640 1.76
25 2.104 2.828 1.87
30 2.823 3.546 2.13
35 2.822 3.546 2.24
40 3.371 4.095 2.35
45 4.072 4.796 2.46








10 2.481 4.275 2.96
15 3.583 5.377 3.34
20 4.165 5.959 3.56
25 4.643 6.437 3.77
30 5.680 7.474 4.32
35 6.896 8.690 4.53
40 7.176 8.970 4.75
45 8.152 9.946 4.97
50 8.910 10.704 5.18
Supplementary Table 3. Accuracy metrics – Team TFHE-Chimera.
#closest tag SNPs 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
All
uAUC 0.9815 0.9901 0.9923 0.9932 0.9936 0.9938 0.9939 0.9940 0.9940 0.9940
MAP 0.8956 0.9303 0.9415 0.9462 0.9485 0.9498 0.9505 0.9509 0.9510 0.9511
Non-ref MAP 0.7290 0.8277 0.8600 0.8734 0.8802 0.8840 0.8862 0.8876 0.8882 0.8886
AFR
uAUC 0.9712 0.9816 0.9846 0.9857 0.9862 0.9863 0.9862 0.9861 0.9859 0.9856
Non-ref MAP 0.6706 0.7610 0.7943 0.8084 0.8148 0.8175 0.8178 0.8175 0.8163 0.8147
AMR
uAUC 0.9865 0.9917 0.9928 0.9931 0.9931 0.9930 0.9929 0.9927 0.9925 0.9923
Non-ref MAP 0.7551 0.8337 0.8536 0.8579 0.8586 0.8572 0.8543 0.8513 0.8481 0.8447
EUR
uAUC 0.9905 0.9948 0.9956 0.9959 0.9959 0.9959 0.9958 0.9957 0.9956 0.9954
Non-ref MAP 0.7765 0.8485 0.8655 0.8698 0.8702 0.8686 0.8673 0.8649 0.8629 0.8607
Supplementary Table 4. Total running time (in seconds) as a function of used core count – Team TFHE-Chimera.
# target SNPs / # cores 1 2 4 8 16 24
20K 4.637 2.740 1.753 1.204 0.913 0.816
40K 11.001 6.262 3.714 2.492 1.925 1.696
80K 21.468 14.181 8.888 5.884 4.275 3.645
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SNU Team Solution
In this section, we describe the solution submitted by the Seoul National University team (ranked 2nd place at iDASH19
Genome Privacy Challenge). We adopted one-hidden layer neural network for the genotype imputation (See Supplementary
Figure 2), and our solution is based on the HEaaN library, which is an implementation of the CKKS7 scheme. Our one-hidden
layer with linear activation setting provides us, according to our experiments, more accurate results than a simple logistic
regression setting. Also, we set the activation function in the hidden layer as the linear function, not ReLU or Sigmoid, because
the linear function gave us higher accuracy than others. Since we use a single hidden layer with linear activation, the output
model after the training phase consists of two weight matrices W (1) and W (2), and we can pre-compute the multiplication of
these matrices W =W (1) ·W (2) before the evaluation phase. In other words, in the evaluation phase, we only need to multiply
one pre-computed weight matrix for each model.
We encoded all SNP data 0,1,2 by (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0,0,1), respectively, so the dimension of SNP data is three
times increased. We denote by X1 ∈ {0,1}M0×3L and Y1 ∈ {0,1}M0×3T the encoded training tag SNP and target SNP matrices,
respectively, where M0 is the number of individuals in training data. We similarly define the encoded test tag/target SNP
matrices as X2 ∈ {0,1}M×3L and Y2 ∈ {0,1}M×3T .
Supplementary Figure 2. We train a model with top two rectangles(in left figure), then predicts emptied bottom right
rectangle with bottom left rectangle data. Our model consists of one hidden linear layer (in right figure).
Plain Model Generation
The most naive approach is to simply train a neural network model from (X1,Y1). In this approach, the output model is a
3L×3T matrix W which makes an error between X1 ·W and Y1 very small, and the genotype score is computed as Ypred = X2 ·W .
The accuracy is determined by the measuring the difference between Y2 and Ypred with a well-known accuracy measurement
such as micro-AUC.
However, as we consider tens of thousands of individuals and target SNPs, the computational cost to deal with X1, Y1 and W
in HE is too large. As a result, it has become necessary to find an alternative approach to reduce the HE operation cost. We start
from the underlying heuristic assumption that each target SNP is mostly influenced by tag SNPs which are close to the target
SNP with respect to the genomic distance. That is, we only consider the closest d variant genotypes for each target SNP.
Under this setting, we can reduce the super-large training data (X ,Y ) ∈ {0,1}M0×3L×{0,1}M0×3T to several small data
(X1i,Y1i) ∈ {0,1}M0×3d ×{0,1}M0×3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ T . Note that Y1i corresponds to the i-th target SNP, and X1i corresponds to
a set of d consecutive tag SNPs that is closest to the i-th target SNP. As an analogue of the training data X1 and Y1, the test
data X2 and Y2 are also divided into T matrices (X2i,Y2i) ∈ {0,1}M×3d×{0,1}M×3. As a result, we train total T neural network
models Wi ∈R3d×3 from each (X1i,Y1i) for 1≤ i≤ T separately, and we will predict Y2 by applying each model on X2i for each
i. Compared to the above naive approach, the size of small weight matrices {Wi}1≤i≤T is L/d times smaller than W ∈ R3L×3T ,
so we can expect L/d times faster performance of the evaluation phase.
Selection of the closest d tag SNPs for each target SNP The term "the closest d tag SNPs" is actually ambiguous since
the distance between a single (target) SNP and multiple (tag) SNPs has not been defined yet. For each target SNP, let di
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be the genomic distance between the target SNP and the i-th tag SNP. We define the closest d tag SNPs to the target SNP
as i,(i+ 1), ...,(i+ d− 1)-th tag SNPs for a certain choice of i which minimizes max0≤ j≤d−1 di+ j = max{di,di+d−1}. An
algorithm to find such i is very simple: Starting from i = 1, compute max{di,di+d−1}. If this max value is larger than
the previous max value for i− 1 then i← i+ 1, and else stop. Note that this simple algorithm is based on the fact that
max{di,di+d−1} has a unique local minima with respect to i. Repeat this procedure for all the target SNPs, then we can obtain
the closest d tag SNPs for every target SNP.
Genotype Score Computation
Let Wi ∈ R3d×3 be a (pre-computed) weight matrix that were trained based on (X1i,Y1i) for 1≤ i≤ T . Then our computation






where [·]r denotes the r-th column, [·]r denotes the r-th row, and ⊙ means the Hadamard multiplication.
We encrypt each [X2i]r separately for 1 ≤ r ≤ 3d and 1 ≤ i ≤ T , then each multiplication [X2i]r · [Wi]r is done by just a
depth-1 constant multiplication. (Here, Wi’s are encoded as CKKS plaintexts, so actually the multiplications are just constant
multiplications.) As a result, our genotype score computation process consists of a number of depth-1 constant multiplications
without any additional operations such as rotation.
Optimization Using Imaginary Parts Technically, we exploit imaginary parts of CKKS plaintext slots to enhance the speed
of genotype score computation. When we compute Hadamard multiplication between two vectors (⃗x1, y⃗1) and (⃗x2, y⃗2), the





−1 · y⃗2). This optimization enables us to reduce the number of matrix multiplications in ∑3dr=1[X2i]r⊙ [Wi]r and
the number of ciphertexts to encrypt X2i by half since two columns can be encrypted in one ciphertext.
Experimental Results
CKKS parameters. As we only require depth 1, we can take extremely small CKKS parameters. We used CKKS parameters
n = 210, q = 227, σ = 3.2 with (uniformly random) signed binary secret, which satisfy more than 128-bit security according to
Albrecht’s LWE estimator3. We choose the scaling factor ∆ = 217 for the encryption of X2 and ∆ = 25 for the plain models
{Wi}1≤i≤T . Note that we set the Hamming weight of the secret by h = ⌊2n/3⌋ in our code, and this corresponds to (uniformly
random) signed binary case: In fact, the estimator outputs the same bit-security for both cases.
Security estimation on our parameter choice, according to lwe-estimator
Experiments Based on HE. Table 5 shows the experimental results on our genotype imputation algorithm with various choices
on the number of target SNPs (T =20K, 40K or 80K) and the number of closed tag SNPs (d = 8k for 1 ≤ k ≤ 12). Note
that the accuracy is measured by micro-AUC. The larger d implies the higher computational cost, but it does not guarantee a
higher accuracy. From Table 5, we can see that d = 40 shows the best accuracy among d = 8k choices. When we set d = 8,
the accuracy somewhat decreases compared to the case d = 40, but it shows about five times faster performance. Finally, the
intermediate choice d = 24 shows a balanced performance in terms of both accuracy and running time. As a result, we set
d = 8, 24 and 40 to be "fast", "balanced" and "best" choice of the number of closest tag SNPs, respectively.
All the experiments were performed on Linux operating systems on a workstation with Intel Platinum 8168 2.7GHz CPU
with a 16-thread environment, compiled with GNU C++ 7.5.0 using the ’-Ofast’ optimization setting.
3Available at https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator.
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Supplementary Table 5. Experimental results of HE-based genotype imputation – SNU Team.
Scheme Number of Number of Time Memory Accuracy




15.231 ms 1.908 sec
1.354 sec
1.104 sec
4.381 sec 5.121 GB 0.9831
16 1.909 sec 4.936 sec 5.14 GB 0.9884
24 2.594 sec 5.621 sec 5.158 GB 0.9895
32 3.103 sec 6.130 sec 5.176 GB 0.9900
40 3.835 sec 6.862 sec 5.195 GB 0.9902
48 4.515 sec 7.542 sec 5.213 GB 0.9902
56 5.384 sec 8.411 sec 5.231 GB 0.9900
64 6.008 sec 9.035 sec 5.25 GB 0.9891
72 7.227 sec 10.254 sec 5.268 GB 0.9890
40K
8
15.231 ms 1.908 sec
2.685 sec
1.985 sec
6.593 sec 7.976 GB 0.9867
16 3.525 sec 7.433 sec 8.012 GB 0.9918
24 5.145 sec 9.053 sec 8.049 GB 0.9929
32 6.093 sec 10.001 sec 8.086 GB 0.9934
40 7.669 sec 11.577 sec 8.122 GB 0.9949
48 9.167 sec 13.075 sec 8.159 GB 0.9935
56 10.667 sec 14.575 sec 8.195 GB 0.9934
64 11.947 sec 15.855 sec 8.232 GB 0.9926
72 13.301 sec 17.209 sec 8.269 GB 0.9926
80K
8
15.231 ms 1.908 sec
4.762 sec
4.156 sec
10.841 sec 13.81 GB 0.9876
16 7.091 sec 13.170 sec 13.884 GB 0.9923
24 9.582 sec 15.661 sec 13.958 GB 0.9934
32 12.244 sec 18.323 sec 14.032 GB 0.9937
40 15.167 sec 21.246 sec 14.106 GB 0.9939
48 18.261 sec 24.340 sec 14.18 GB 0.9939
56 21.009 sec 27.088 sec 14.254 GB 0.9938
64 24.092 sec 30.171 sec 14.328 GB 0.9929
72 26.934 sec 33.013 sec 14.402 GB 0.9929
Supplementary Figure 3. microAUC precision versus number of closest SNPs for different populations – SNU Team.
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EPFL-Lattigo Team Solution
In this section, we explain the EPFL solution that relies on a multinomial logistic regression model to perform genotype
imputation on homomorphically encrypted data. Our solution is built on the publicly available Lattigo Library18 that notably
offers centralized and distributed (multiparty) implementations of the BFV6 and CKKS19 schemes. Here, we use Lattigo’s
optimized implementation of the full-RNS variant of the centralized CKKS scheme.
Algorithm
Our goal is to design an efficient and accurate HE method for imputing missing entries in a given variant-genotype dataset.
A SNP entry can take three different values: 0 for homozygous reference (0|0), 1 for heterozygous (1|0 or 0|1) and 2 for
homozygous alternate (1|1). We train a multinomial logistic regression model, i.e., the model is trained jointly for the three
label classes, for each position in which there are missing entries, by using a publicly available population panel.
The model is trained on plaintext data and is then stored in plaintext at a semi-honest server that provides prediction-as-a-
service on homomorphically encrypted input data. In order to impute or predict a missing variant genotype, the model relies on
the genotypes of variants in a d-sized hood of the missing entry (i.e., the closest d−1 variant genotypes).
Training on Plaintext Data. The logistic regression model is trained on a plaintext population panel for each of the T target
positions, i.e., corresponding to missing entries for patients for which the imputation has to be performed. This panel is either
publicly available, or available to the server that performs the training. We therefore obtain a vector w(·, j,g) = [w(·, j,g)0 , . . . ,w
(·, j,g)
d−1 ]
of d regression coefficients for each target position j = 1,2, . . . ,T and each label class, i.e., genotype g ∈ {0,1,2}.
Prediction on Encrypted Data. To perform the imputation on encrypted data, we use a full-RNS variant of the CKKS
scheme, which enables arithmetic over Cn/2. The CKKS parameters are denoted by the tuple (n,L,σ ,∆), where n, a power of
two, is the degree of the cyclotomic polynomial that defines the used ring, L is the maximum level of a ciphertext, σ is the
standard deviation of the noise distribution, and ∆ is the plaintext scale that we choose also as a power of two. The plaintext and
ciphertext spaces share the same domain and are represented by polynomials in RQℓ = ZQℓ [X ]/(X
n +1), with Qℓ = Πi∈{0,...,ℓ}qi
for 0≤ ℓ≤ L where each qi is a prime with qi ≡ 1 (mod 2n). We can use two encodings: the map Cn/2→ RQ (slot packing)
enables a plaintext to encode up to n/2 complex values with component-wise additions and multiplications, whereas the
map Rn → RQ (coefficient packing) enables encoding up to n real values in a plaintext, with a component-wise addition
and multiplication by a scalar. We use the latter encoding, as component-wise products are not required in our solution and
coefficient packing achieves a higher packing efficiency. Homomorphic operations are carried across all the values in a single
instruction, multiple data (SIMD) fashion.
For this task, we consider a set of P patients, each having the same T missing genotype variants (i.e., T = 20k,40k or 80k
in the main example). The server has a pre-trained model of d regression coefficients for each of the T target positions and for
each class label (i.e., g ∈ {0,1,2}).
For each target position j and for each patient p, the probability for each label is obtained by computing:



















where {w(·, j,g)0 , . . . ,w
(·, j,g)
d−1 } are the regression coefficients for label g and position j, and {z
(p, j,·)
1 , . . . ,z
(p, j,·)
d−1 } are the ing variants







in the encrypted domain, such that the result can be decrypted and used in the computation of the soft-max function. The (hard)
prediction y(p, j,g) for g∈ {0,1,2}, p = 1, ...,P and j = 1, ...,T can also be obtained by taking y(p, j,g) = argmaxg(P[y = g|z
(p, j)
r ]).
We now describe how to simultaneously perform the predictions for P patients for a specific position j by expressing the
computations in matrix operations and relying on SIMD, as graphically depicted in Figure 4. The plaintext-trained models for
each label compose three matrices W0,W1 and W2 that are represented in blue in Figure 4. Each matrix has T columns and d
rows. The input tag SNPs are represented in a matrix Z of P rows (patients) and 16184 (number of tag SNPs) columns. Z is
encrypted column-wise, i.e., each column is a ciphertext.
The predictions for P patients for a specific target position j is performed by first selecting a sub-matrix Z j of Z containing d
columns corresponding to the d closest s of position j, and by selecting the corresponding column j in each Wg ,∀ g ∈ {0,1,2}.
The selected columns are duplicated P times to form matrices Wg, j for each g ∈ {0,1,2} of d rows and P columns. The rows
of these matrices are each encoded in plaintext.
For each target position j, the multiplications between the rows of Z j and the columns of Wg, j are concurrently performed,
such that the resulting three ciphertexts (i.e., one for each label) can be decrypted. The resulting plaintexts are then processed
through the soft-max function, and the maximum value at each position, among the three labels, determines the predicted label
for patient p at position j.
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Supplementary Figure 4. Predictions for T target positions in P patients.
Optimizations
We optimize the encryption of patient input data, its compression, and the encoding of the regression coefficients, to minimize
storage needs, bandwidth and computation overhead. We use different scale factors ∆Patient for the patient input data (which are
already integers) and the coefficients ∆Model .
Encryption of Input Tag SNPs Matrix Z. The matrix Z has P rows and 16184 columns, i.e., each column contains the SNPs
of all P patients for a position j. We pack and encrypt each column in one ciphertext, i.e., Z is made of 16184 ciphertexts,
each encrypting P = 1004 values. The prediction is performed by using plaintext model coefficients (clear-text values for the
imputation server) that are equal for all patients, hence only ciphertext multiplications by scalar plaintexts are required (no
polynomial products are needed). Thus, we do not need to use slot packing Cn/2→ RQ[X ]/(Xn +1) of the CKKS scheme
and can directly encode the columns of Z in the coefficients of polynomials in RQ; instead, we use a coefficient packing
approach. Additions and multiplications by a scalar are commutative between the time and frequency (coefficients and slots)
domains. The encoding therefore consists of a mapping from R[X ]/(Xn +1)→ ZQ[X ]/(Xn +1) that is simply done by scaling
the coefficients by a plaintext scale ∆Patient, rounding them and taking them modulo Q. The inverse mapping is simply the
inverse scaling. This enables us to pack twice as many values per ciphertext, i.e., n instead of n/2. This reduces the data and
algorithmic complexity during all the steps (encryption, prediction and decryption) by a factor of two, compared to using the
default CKKS slot-encoding approach. It also improves the plaintext precision, as no approximate Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) is needed for encoding and decoding. Finally, as the client is the one encrypting the inputs and the owner of the secret
key, we perform all encryptions with the secret key, therefore reducing the noise of fresh ciphertexts.
Client-Server Communication Each row of the Z matrix can be encrypted in a single ciphertext, providing that the ring
degree n is large enough. In our setting, P = 1004 and n = 1024, hence the encryption of the matrix generates 16184 ciphertexts.
Since a fresh encrypted ciphertext is of the form (−a · sk+m+ e,a), the a polynomial can be generated in a deterministic
way using a seeded pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and only the seed needs to be sent to the server that can then
reconstruct the polynomial. This further reduces the amount of data to be sent to the server by a factor of two. Here, each
coefficient can be effectively represented by a uint32 that can be stored in four bytes; the PRNG seeds have a size of 64 bytes
each. Furthermore, we can use a single seed per encryption instance (instead of one per ciphertext). The total size of the fresh
encrypted data is thus 16184 ·1024 ·4+ k ·64 bytes where k is the number of encryption instances running in parallel. This
amounts to a total of approximately 66 MB. The server prediction data comprises 3 ·TargetSNPs ciphertexts, which, for the
largest setting (80k), amounts to 3 ·80882 ·2 ·1024 ·4 bytes; i.e., approximately 2GB.
Prediction The model coefficients matrices Wg, j for a target position j and for g ∈ {0,1,2}, each have d rows and P
columns. Each row is encoded in a plaintext of identical values and is then multiplied with a ciphertext in the prediction. This
multiplication can therefore be reduced to a multiplication by a plaintext scalar. Moreover, to facilitate constant additions
(addition of w(·, j,g)0 in Equation 1) and to avoid the need of computing a plaintext NTT for every prediction, the server pre-
computes a plaintext in the NTT domain of the ciphertext with all coefficients set to one (and scaled by the factor ∆Patient). It
can then be used as a basis for all the subsequent constant additions, as it effectively switches the problem from a constant
addition in the NTT domain back to a constant multiplication in the NTT domain. Finally, the coefficients Wg, j of the model
needed for a specific prediction are mapped from R to ZQ by computing ⌈∆ModelWg, j⌋ mod Q. We then avoid all modular
reductions during the rest of the prediction by using a 29-bit prime for the modulus and performing all computations within
uint64 variables. This enables us to do up to 64 (26) successive constant multiplications and additions without a risk of uint64
overflow because (229−1) · (229−1) ·26 < 264. As the maximal window size d that we use is 64, the modular reduction can be
done once after the d-1 additions.
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Supplementary Table 6. Experimental results of HE-based genotype imputation – EPFL Team.
Scheme Number of Number of Time (sec) Memory (GB)






































Supplementary Table 7. Accuracy metrics – EPFL Team.
Window size 4 8 16 32 48 64
Accuracy 0.8509 0.9140 0.9422 0.9516 0.9546 0.9547
Micro AUC 0.9659 0.9867 0.9929 0.9935 0.9950 0.9945
Parameters and Security
We describe here the parametrization for the prediction model and for the cryptosystem, to achieve the required level of
bit-security. The plaintext scale for the patient data is ∆Patient = 216 and the plaintext scale for the model data is ∆Model = 27.
Cryptographic Parameters We use the ring degree n = 210, as it enables the required homomorphic capacity with a security
level of at least 128 bits. As all ciphertexts are encrypted using the secret key and no homomorphic multiplication is needed, the
distribution of the secret key has no impact on the underlying error. For this reason, both the secret-key and error polynomial
are sampled from χerr, which is a truncated Gaussian distribution with the standard deviation σ = 3.2 and a bound set to ⌊6σ⌋.
This enables increasing the modulus from 27 bits (with a dense ternary key) to 29 bits (with Gaussian key), while still ensuring
a security of 128 bits, according to the Homomorphic Encryption Standardization whitepaper20. Consequently, it enables a
larger ∆Model that also increases the precision of the prediction.
Experimental Results
Our source code is developed in GoLang, and builds on top of the Lattigo Library18 and its optimized implementation of the
full-RNS variant of the centralized CKKS scheme. Our experiments were performed on a machine with Intel Xeon Platinum
8168 CPU at 2.7 GHz with 769 GB RAM.Table 6 presents the performance of our solution for the genotype imputation of
T = 20k, 40k and 80k SNPs for P = 1004 patients and different window sizes. As in the main paper, we limited the number
of threads to 16. It must be noted that our solution is parallelized at multiple levels. It leverages the GoLang capabilities to
execute the encryption, prediction and decryption in parallel across several ciphertexts, and it relies on the SIMD capability of
the encryption scheme to parallelize the intra-ciphertext operations.
We obtain the same accuracy when the predictions are performed on encrypted data or on cleartext data, i.e., there is no
precision loss. Table 7 reports the accuracy achieved with different window sizes, when the model is trained and tested on all
the patients (ALL) or on a specific part of the population (African AFR, American AMR and European EUR patients).
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UTHealth-Microsoft Research Team Solution
In this section, we explain the secure outsourced genotype imputation protocols developed by UT Health Science Center at
Houston (UTHealth) and Microsoft Research (MSR). We provide implementations of linear imputation models by using two
different HE frameworks – BFV5, 6 and CKKS7. Our secure imputation protocols are implemented in C++ with Microsoft
SEAL version 3.421, which includes implementations of BFV and CKKS. Our code can be downloaded from https:
//github.com/K-miran/UTMSR_HEmpute.
Methods
The model in the current study is a linear model where each variant genotype is modeled using genotypes of tag variants within
k variant vicinity of the target variant (i.e., genotypes of the closest d = 2k tag variants to the target variant). We used the Gnu
Scientific Library (GSL) library4 to train the linear model weights.
Plaintext version. The tag variants of M samples is represented as a matrix G = (gi,ℓ) ∈ {0,1,2}M×L. Let gℓ be the ℓth
column of the matrix G. For j = 1,2, . . . ,T , we let {g j1 , . . . ,g jd} be a set of the closet d variant genotypes of the jth target
variant and denote the learned model coefficients by w j = (w j0 ,w j1 , . . . ,w jd ). Then the linear model can be used to estimate
the missing genotypes by computing the column vector




w jr ·g jr ∈ RM, (2)
where g̃i, j represents the imputed genotype estimate of the ith sample for the jth target variant and w j0 is a column vector
obtained by making M copies of the intercept term w j0 .




i for ℓ= 1, . . . ,L and then encrypted as a ciphertext ct.gℓ using an underlying HE scheme. In the BFV scheme, the
inner product between an encryption ct of a plaintext pt and the secret s of the HE scheme has the form of
⟨ct, s⟩= ⌊q/p⌋ ·pt+ e (mod q)
for the plaintext modulus p and some small error polynomial e, so that a real message can be easily recovered by dividing
⌊q/p⌋ and rounding the result. Here, we denote by [·]q reduction modulo q into the interval [0,q). Whilst, in the CKKS scheme,
it has the form of
⟨ct, s⟩= pt+ e (mod q)
for some small error e, which is an approximate value of the plaintext. This encoding procedure results in some loss of precision,
hence plaintext values should be multiplied by a scaling factor of ∆tag to ensure that the encoded values retain enough precision.
Our underlying HE schemes deal only with integers, hence we should convert the real-valued model parameters into
finite-precision integers. Let ∆wt be a pre-determined quantization parameter for the weight parameters. In the BFV scheme,
each slope coefficient of the parameters is converted into an element in the ring R/pR by taking pt.w jr = [∆wt ·w jr ]p for
r = 1, . . . ,d. In particular, the intercept term is encoded as an integral polynomial pt.w j0 = ∑
M−1
i=0 [∆wt ·w j0 ]pX i.
In the context of the CKKS scheme, the slope coefficient is transformed into an element in the ring R/qR by computing
pt.w jr = [∆wt ·w jr ]q. As mentioned above, the tag variants are multiplied by a factor of ∆tag before encryption, so the intercept
is encoded as pt.w j0 = ∑
M−1
i=0 [∆wt0 ·w j0 ]qX i for ∆wt0 := ∆wt ·∆tag in order to keep their common scaling factor of the results.
After the data owner encrypts the genotype plaintext and sends them to the server, the server performs constant addition
and multiplication operations on the encrypted genotype data by using the encoded weight polynomials. To be precise, the jth





pt.w jr · ct.g jr ,
where ct.g jr represents an encryption of the plaintext pt.g jr . Algorithm 2 and 3 provide explicit descriptions of homomorphic
evaluation of genotype imputation based on the BFV and CKKS schemes, respectively.
4http://www.gnu.org/software/gsl/
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Algorithm 2 Secure genotype imputation protocol based on the BFV scheme.
Require: Ciphertexts of tag variants {ct.gℓ}1≤ℓ≤L; regression coefficients {w j = (w j0 ,w j1 , . . . ,w jd )}1≤ j≤T
Ensure: Encrypted genotype estimate values {ct.g̃ j}1≤ j≤T
1: for 1≤ j ≤ T do
2: for 1≤ r ≤ d do
3: pt.w jr ← [∆wt ·w jr ]p
4: end for
5: pt.w j0 ← ∑
M−1
i=0 [∆wt ·w j0 ]pX i
6: ct.g̃ j← pt.w j0 +∑
d
r=1(pt.w jr · ct.g jr)
7: end for
Algorithm 3 Secure genotype imputation protocol based on the CKKS scheme.
Require: Ciphertexts of tag variants {ct.gℓ}1≤ℓ≤L; regression coefficients {w j = (w j0 ,w j1 , . . . ,w jd )}1≤ j≤T ; the scaling factor
of tag variants ∆tag
Ensure: Encrypted genotype estimate values {ct.g̃ j}1≤ j≤T
1: for 1≤ j ≤ T do
2: for 1≤ r ≤ d do
3: pt.w jr ← [∆wt ·w jr ]q
4: end for
5: pt.w j0 ← ∑
M−1
i=0 [∆wt ·∆tag ·w j0 ]qX i
6: ct.g̃ j← pt.w j0 +∑
d
r=1(pt.w jr · ct.g jr)
7: end for















































(∆wt ·w jr) ·pt.g jr ,
where the first equality follows from Eq. (2). This implies that the ith coefficient of the plaintext polynomial obtained from















































(∆wt ·w jr) ·pt.g jr .
Therefore, the ith coefficient of the plaintext polynomial obtained from decryption is approximate to the predicted value g̃i j
scaled by the factor of ∆wt0 .
Experiments
Parameters and Security. In our implementation, we used ∆wt = 6 to encode the slope coefficients of the model parameters.
Also, we chose ∆tag = 216 to encode the tag variant genotypes in the CKKS scheme, so that it can reduce the precision
loss in homomorphic computation. We note that all the operations on plaintext polynomials are performed modulo p in the
BFV scheme, thus the final result should be less than the plaintext coefficient modulus p so that no reduction modulo p
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Supplementary Table 8. Experimental results of secure genotype imputation protocols on the testing genotype dataset with
1,004 individuals in a 16-thread environment – UTHealth-MSR Team.
Scheme # target # tag variants Time Memory Macro Accuracy







0.614 sec 0.994 GB 0.8512 0.6712
8 0.276 sec 0.686 sec 0.998 GB 0.8948 0.7771
16 0.508 sec 0.918 sec 1.034 GB 0.9181 0.8360
32 0.699 sec 1.109 sec 1.114 GB 0.9286 0.8629
48 0.899 sec 1.308 sec 1.211 GB 0.9314 0.8701






1.271 sec 1.826 GB 0.8634 0.6857
8 0.594 sec 1.460 sec 1.832 GB 0.9099 0.8004
16 0.919 sec 1.786 sec 1.873 GB 0.9349 0.8656
32 1.477 sec 2.343 sec 1.947 GB 0.9463 0.8940
48 1.766 sec 2.632 sec 2.026 GB 0.9493 0.9018






2.599 sec 3.518 GB 0.8700 0.7042
8 1.280 sec 3.029 sec 3.539 GB 0.9153 0.8143
16 2.163 sec 3.912 sec 3.572 GB 0.9393 0.8753
32 2.790 sec 4.539 sec 3.654 GB 0.9502 0.9017
48 5.735 sec 7.484 sec 3.721 GB 0.9533 0.9090







0.465 sec 1.003 GB 0.8506 0.6666
8 0.228 sec 1.019 sec 1.007 GB 0.8944 0.7733
16 0.436 sec 1.259 sec 1.020 GB 0.9177 0.8329
32 0.703 sec 1.015 sec 1.109 GB 0.9283 0.8602
48 0.907 sec 1.218 sec 1.194 GB 0.9311 0.8675






1.006 sec 1.825 GB 0.8629 0.6810
8 0.664 sec 1.179 sec 1.834 GB 0.9095 0.7968
16 1.278 sec 1.619 sec 1.866 GB 0.9347 0.8628
32 2.289 sec 1.887 sec 1.944 GB 0.9460 0.8918
48 3.526 sec 2.145 sec 1.983 GB 0.9491 0.8997






2.053 sec 3.517 GB 0.8696 0.6999
8 1.013 sec 2.427 sec 3.538 GB 0.9150 0.8109
16 1.616 sec 3.030 sec 3.572 GB 0.9390 0.8726
32 2.798 sec 4.212 sec 3.653 GB 0.9500 0.8995
48 5.546 sec 6.960 sec 3.721 GB 0.9531 0.9070
64 6.362 sec 7.776 sec 3.802 GB 0.9548 0.9114
occurs. As a result, we took the plaintext modulus p = 210 to get the correct results after decryption. Next, in both cases, we
used the ciphertext modulus logq = 27 to guarantee the correctness of decryption in BFV or ensure that no overflow occurs
during computation in CKKS. We choose the secret key from the uniform distribution over the set of polynomials in R whose
coefficients are in {−1,0,1}. Each coefficient of an error is sampled from the discrete Gaussian distribution centered at zero
with standard deviation of σ = 3.2. Finally, we took the ciphertext dimension n = 210 to provide at least 128-bit security level
from the HE standardization workshop paper20.
Experimental Results. Our experiments were conducted on a machine with Intel Platinum 8168 2.7GHz CPU in a 16-thread
environment, compiled with GNU C++ 7.5.0 using the ‘-O3’ optimization setting. Our secure imputation protocol takes around
one millisecond for key generation. Table 8 presents the performance results for secure genotype imputation with various
numbers of target variants (T ) and various numbers of tag variants as features for each target variant (d). In the seventh and
eighth columns, we present the total running time and the peak of the memory required for the secure imputation process,
respectively. The last two columns give the macro-aggregated accuracies over all the predictions and non-reference genotype
predictions. As seen in the table, the executive time of secure imputation process is almost linear on the target variant dataset
size T . Overall, with the increasing number of predictors d, it results in a decrease in time performance but provides an increase
in imputation accuracy.
Depending on the choice of the model, we can include a small or wide range of neighboring SNPs into consideration, and
involve light or heavy arithmetic operations in the computation. As shown in Figure 5, such a choice will have two major effects:
(1) the efficiency of the model and (2) the accuracy of the prediction. We estimated the prediction accuracy using micro-AUCs
of the actual genotypes and the imputed genotypes. The accuracy of the prediction is around 0.9817 from the small-sized
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model (linear model with d = 8), 0.9908 from the medium-sized model (linear model with d = 32), and 0.9916 from the
large-sized model (linear model with d = 64). Our experimental results show that the medium-sized model is optimal for
timing and imputation accuracy in the current testing dataset. As a result, the best end-to-end performance of the most balanced
model is approximately 52 microseconds per variant per 1000 individuals ((4.212 sec×1000 individuals)/(80,882 variants×
1004 individuals)).
Figure 6 shows the timing results of the CKKS-based evaluation with various number of available threads. To show the
scalability, we selected the most balanced model with 32 tag variants as features for each target variant. Our implementation
exploits multiple cores, when available. And these results show that with at least up to 16 cores the speed-ups scale linearly
with the number of cores.
















Supplementary Figure 5. The UTHealth-MSR team’s CKKS implementation of the linear model Md on the whole dataset (of
80K target variants) with respect to various numbers of tag variants at features for each target variants (d). The accuracy in
y-axis means the micro-AUC of the predicted genotypes.



















Supplementary Figure 6. Total running time result of the UTHealth-MSR team’s CKKS implementation with respect to
various target variant dataset size and threads (log-log scale) when using the medium-sized linear model (with 32 tag variants
as features).
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Supplementary Figure 7. The confusion matrices for the 8 benchmarked imputation methods. Each plot shows the confusion
matrix for a method where x-axis shows the real genotype and y-axis shows the imputed genotype. Each cell contains the
normalized frequency of confusions with respect to the total number of imputed genotypes, i.e. rows. The correctly predicted
genotypes, i.e., the diagonals are censored intentionally (Marked with ‘X’) to make the colors more interpretable and
comparable. The numeric value of each confusion entry is included for comparison of the confusion values.
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Supplementary Figure 8a and 8b. Figure 8a shows the position (x-axis) vs genotype concordance (y-axis). Each point is a
variant and color indicates the minor allele frequency. Figure 8b shows the MAF (x-axis) and genotype concordance for
different secure methods, as indicated by each color.
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Supplementary Figure 8c. Pairwise comparison of the secure methods. Each point represents an untyped (target) variant and
colors indicate the minor allele frequency of the variants. The compared methods are indicated on the X-axis and Y-axis labels.
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Supplementary Table 9. Rare Variant Imputation Performance Statistics for SNU-CKKS.
Seconds Mbytes
WindowSize AUC Keygen Encryp. Eval. Decryp. Total Memory
8 0.9976 1.718 1933.38 9410.98 7741 19087.08 18227
16 0.9982 1.693 2002.71 16884.80 9212 28101.20 18227
24 0.9957 1.774 2116.67 23702.10 8233 34053.54 18227
32 0.9976 1.990 2127.51 29063.50 8145 39338.00 18227
40 0.9919 1.776 1999.89 35818.50 7930 45750.17 18227
48 0.9849 1.967 2135.28 45878.40 9088 57103.65 18227
56 0.9751 1.814 1997.14 51865.40 8284 61968.35 18227
Supplementary Table 10. Rare Variant Imputation Performance Statistics for Chimera-TFHE.
Seconds Mbytes
Window Size Concordance Keygen Encryp. Eval. Decryp. Total Memory
5 0.9728 9.4E-5 1.7 3.5 1.6 6.8 3700
10 0.9772 9.4E-5 1.7 5.5 1.6 8.8 4100
15 0.9801 9.4E-5 1.7 7.5 1.6 10.8 4700
20 0.9819 9.4E-5 1.7 9.5 1.6 12.7 5000
25 0.9830 9.4E-5 1.7 11.3 1.6 14.6 5300
30 0.9837 9.4E-5 1.7 13.4 1.6 16.7 6100
35 0.9841 9.4E-5 1.7 15.6 1.6 18.9 6400
40 0.9844 9.4E-5 1.7 17.1 1.6 20.3 6700
45 0.9845 9.4E-5 1.7 19.0 1.6 22.2 7100
50 0.9847 9.4E-5 1.7 21.6 1.6 24.8 7400
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